Adam Szweda (Toruń)

Polish and Teutonic diplomatic activity in Europe during the conflict of 1409-1411

The calling of the Lithuanian Duke Jagiełło to the Polish throne was an event which in the near perspective completely changed the political situation in the borderlands of Christian Europe. Especially significant changes took place from the point of view of the Teutonic Order, which held its territorial rule in Prussia in order to spread the Christian faith. The baptism of Lithuania was a blow to ideological foundations of the activity of the Order in this part of Europe. Another aspect of this event was a return of the Polish-Teutonic conflict after some dozen years of peace which lasted since the Peace of Kalisz in 1343.1 The attitude of the authorities of the corporation is therefore of no surprise. Initially, the Royal dignity of Władysław Jagiełło was not acknowledged by them, as expressed in charters issued at that time, particularly those confirming alliances made against the new Polish King. Therefore, in the charter of alliance between the Teutonic Order and the dukes of Szczecin in 1386 “Jagiełło, who holds himself for the King of Poland”2 is mentioned. Mentions of similar nature may also be found in some sources from 1386-1392.3 The King himself complained in April 1386 that his baptism name was not acknowledged in Teutonic letters. Instead, he was called with his former name “Jagiełło.” Furthermore, he was addressed with “you” singular, which – as the ruler maintained – insulted not only him, but all the inhabitants of the Kingdom.4 According to the testimony of the then Archbishop of Gniezno Mikołaj Trąba, made in 1422 during the trial before the Papal legate Antonio Zeno, already after the baptism of the Lithuanian Duke Grand Master Konrad Zöllner von Rotenstein sent letters to him which were addressed “to eminent man Jagiełło, who holds himself for the King of Poland.”5 These mentions well depict difficulties faced by the Polish diplomacy in the relations with the Teutonic Order in the first years of the rule of Władysław Jagiełło. As mentioned, there was the formally valid Peace of Kalisz of 1343 between the Kingdom of Poland and the Prussian territorial rule of the Grand Master. However, Polish dignitaries participated in negotiations with Teutonic diplomats already since January 1388. In subsequent rounds of negotiations they discussed complex Lithuanian affairs.6 The dynamics of mutual relations led to the outbreak of an open military conflict. Its direct cause was the conflict for the suzerainty over Samogitia – it was formally assigned to the Teutonic Order, but Vytautas (Witold) Grand Duke of Lithuania aimed at changing this. He received support from his paternal cousin Władysław Jagiełło King of Poland and Supreme Duke of Lithuania. Diplomatic activities of the Polish-Lithuanian party led to Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen sending the declaration of war to the Polish ruler on 6 August 1409. In the middle of that month the Teutonic troops attacked the land of Dobrzyń. 7
The first phase of the war ended with a truce on 8 October 1409. It caused the Polish-Teutonic conflict to emerge for the first time in the international arena in such a clear manner.
The interruption of hostilities took place in result of the mediation of the envoys of Wenceslaus IV of Luxembourg, King of the Romans and of Bohemia. Although already in 1400 he was dethroned in favour of Ruprecht Wittelsbach Palatine of the Rhine by the majority of the electors of the Empire, it was at that time that the political position of Wenceslaus consolidated. This was due to the fact that Wenceslaus, as opposed to his rival, accepted the decisions of the Council of Pisa, which aimed at liquidating the Great Western Schism. By means of undertaking the mediation in the Polish-Teutonic conflict, Wenceslaus underlined his return to the actual fulfilment of the rights of the King of the Romans in the public forum.8 One of the terms of the truce stated that the conflict was to be decided upon by the arbitration of Wenceslaus. It was decided that the last possible date of issue of the verdict by Wenceslaus would be on 9 February 1410. The Teutonic envoys – Werner von Tettingen Great Hospitaller and Commander of Elbląg and Albrecht von Schwarzburg Commander of Toruń arrived in Prague already on 4 January 1410.9 According to the relation of the Toruń Annals, it was then that dignitaries from the Kingdom of Poland arrived there. We know the names of the representatives of the Polish party only from the relation of Jan Długosz. They were: Wojciech Jastrzębiec Bishop of Poznań, Zbigniew of Brzezie Marshall of the Kingdom, Wincenty of Granowo Castellan of Nakło and Starost of Greater Poland, Andrzej of Brochocice and Donin of Skrzyńsko Clerk of the Chancery of the Kingdom. Other members of the mission were Jan Butrym of Żyrmuny and Mikołaj Cebulka as the representatives of Grand Duke Vytautas, Ścibor of Sąchocin Marshall of Janusz I Duke of Czersk and Mikołaj Plichta Marshall of Siemowit IV Duke of Płock.10 According to the Toruń source, the issue of the verdict was preceded with long debates, and Wenceslaus IV took advice of his brother Sigismund, Jost Margrave of Moravia as well as Bohemian advisers and numerous other lords.11 The narration of the charter of the King of the Romans and of Bohemia also ensures about a proper course of the arbitration procedures. According to this source, the verdict was issued after the arbitrator had examined the complaints of the parties, the responses to these complaints, as well as charters submitted by both delegations.12 The chronicle of the Official of Pomesania completed this relation with a statement that Vytautas was excluded from the peace and the verdict, his envoys were turned out and their documents (their credentials and possibly their proxy) were publicly torn into pieces.13 This incident, provided that it is authentic, corresponds to the problem of Lithuania and the Grand Duke being included in the October truce, since they were not mentioned in its text.
The arbitrator’s verdict was issued on 8 February 1410.14 Wenceslaus IV, basing his verdict upon the formal-legal ground, decided that the status quo ante should be restored. That meant that the land of Dobrzyń was to come back to the King and the Crown, while Samogitia was to come back under the Order’s rule. Furthermore, terms of the Peace of Kalisz of 1343 and the Pact of Raciąż of 1404 were to be renewed. Finally, mutual charges concerning the violation of these treaties in the period preceding the outbreak of the war were to be examined.15
The Polish delegates in Prague treated the decisions of the arbitrator in a very unfavourable manner. According to the Prussian chronicler, they refused to accept the verdict and left the final decision to their ruler. This provoked a fierce reaction of the Bohemian monarch, who is said to have accused the envoys of the usurpation of the Royal power (as Władysław Jagiełło accepted the contents of the verdict “in advance”) and to have even threatened Poland with war.16 The course of events is depicted in a different way in the relation of Długosz. The Poles, sensing the contents of the verdict, are said to have refused to hear it, as the charter was read in German. They were not satisfied, either, with a declaration that the verdict would be said in Czech. The chronicler says that the envoys of Władysław Jagiełło prudently presented a limited compromissum (i.e., a written arbitration agreement) and kept the document with more comprehensive contents for themselves. However, in the light of other sources referring to the trial before Wenceslaus IV such a statement does not seem probable.17
Although the arbitration procedure was broken off by the Polish diplomats, the arbitrator and the Teutonic party followed the scenario as delineated in the verdict of the King of the Romans. Therefore, their representatives arrived in Wrocław on 11 May 1410, where previous peace treaties between the Kingdom and the Order were to be renewed. Having waited in vain for the Polish envoys, the Teutonic Knights took care of describing the course of events in a notarial instrument. They also solemnly protested against the King of Poland having broken his word. 18 The next stage of the assumed arbitration was to be a convention of the Polish and the Teutonic envoys with Wenceslaus IV. It was to take place on 1 June 1410 in a current place of his residence. Therefore, the Teutonic envoys went to Prague, where the King of Bohemia stayed at that time. The representatives of Władysław Jagiełło (Donin of Skrzyńsko, the later Vice-Chancellor, and Mikołaj Morawiec, the valet of the Royal chamber) also arrived there. They did not intend, however, to hear the verdict of the King, but attempted at persuading Wenceslaus IV to undertake a joint action against the Teutonic Knights, in line with his previous pacts with the King of Poland. 19 The activity of the Polish envoys did not change the attitude of Wenceslaus IV, especially as he had no rational reason to modify his verdict. That is why such were the contents of his charters, issued in Prague on 4 and 5 June 1410.20 In the first one the King of the Romans declared that his verdict was valid and both parties had previously obliged to respect it. However, one party followed the provisions of the verdict while the other did not. In his other charter he specified that Ulrich von Jungingen had fulfilled the provisions of the verdict, as opposed to Władysław Jagiełło. In result of that, Wenceslaus IV released the Order from all legal claims which were extant at the moment of issue of the verdict. The last charter, issued upon the request of the Grand Master, was the transumpt of the charter of the King of Poland, in which the latter obliged to accept the provisions of the verdict of Wenceslaus IV. The second source is no question of key importance, as it in fact meant an acceptance of the territorial acquisitions of the Order. It was anyway understood that way by the Teutonic Knights themselves, as the Toruń Franciscan source recorded that in Prague, as the Polish envoys had absented themselves, King Wenceslaus had assigned the land of Dobrzyń to the Order to be perpetually possessed.21
Anyway, the charters of the King of Bohemia and of the Romans issued in Prague in June 1410 terminate the arbitration before Wenceslaus IV. In result of the development of the situation in the Empire, he issued his verdict in the spirit of a formal respect to extant pacts between Poland and Lithuania and the Teutonic Order. Such an attitude naturally favoured the Order, as it was the Polish-Lithuanian party that aimed at changing the status quo. The Poles therefore concentrated on other kinds of diplomatic activity in order to achieve their goals. The propaganda activity of the Kingdom commenced just after the conflict had broken out, as the first manifesto to the European public opinion bears the date of 10 August 1409. The Polish monarch denied the Teutonic claims that the Christianity was not spread in Lithuania. On his part, he pointed out the lack of progress of the faith in Prussia and Samogitia. According to the King, the Order, being oblivious of laws and privileges, burned with unrestrained desire to possess others’ lands, which it took by violence. Such an attitude was contrasted with the proceedings of the King himself. As all that he desired was to maintain the peace, he redeemed the land of Dobrzyń from the Order for an enormous sum of money, although the land was unjustly detached from the Kingdom. The Teutonic Knights, however, inflicted new injuries; they also seized Santok, Drezdenko and territories belonging to Janusz I Duke of Masovia (these were not specified in the source). The monarch therefore asked Christian rulers not to believe in Teutonic charges against Poland and not to offer any military support to them. 22
Much more specified and extensive charges against the Order were stated in the memorial of Władysław Jagiełło of 9 September 1409. It was addressed to Christian ecclesiastical and secular lords and princes. In its first part (being of general nature), the monarch pointed out invasive activities of the Teutonic Knights towards the lands of the Kingdom. He then resisted their charges of him having the Christian faith in contempt and intending to conquer their territory in alliance with numerous pagans. Eventually, he concisely mentioned recent aggressive steps of the Order: the affair of Drezdenko and Santok, the unlawful seizure of part of the lands belonging to Duke Janusz I, and restrictions against Polish merchants in Prussia. He also referred in a broader manner to the recent Teutonic foray to the land of Dobrzyń. In the second part of this document 29 charges of various nature against the Order were mentioned. Some of these (not always formulated in a precise way) referred to temporally distant affairs, such as the refusal of Grand Master Konrad Zöllner von Rotenstein to be the godfather at the baptism of Jagiełło, the first pledge of the land of Dobrzyń or incitement of Jagiełło’s Lithuanian relatives against him. Twelve charges repeated matters of controversy which had already been submitted to the Grand Master by the Polish mission in June 1409 in Elbląg. Several next ones (which were not very precise, either) concerned the disrespectful attitude of the Teutonic Knights towards Polish envoys (and matters of controversy which were submitted by the latter) and the Teutonic non-observance of valid treaties. With regard to Samogitia, the King underlined the complete lack of the Order’s effort to spread the Christian faith among the local population. Finally, he mentioned the August invasion which ended with the Teutonic seizure of the land of Dobrzyń.23 On the same day a parallel manifesto was prepared under the name of Grand Duke Vytautas. After a long general discourse on the machinations of the Teutonic Knights, Vytautas commenced his claims in a rather surprising manner. He mentioned his attempts at mediating in the case of the unlawful seizure of the Polish strongholds in Santok and Drezdenko by the Order (referring to the events of 1407-1408). Then, he generally depicted the case of an insult suffered from a “certain” Teutonic commander (what was meant was the conflict with Markward von Salzbach Commander of Brandenburg, which is known from previous correspondence of the Grand Duke and the Grand Master) and the ineffectiveness of his complaints to the superior of the Order. Merchants (probably Lithuanian ones) were said to be discriminated against in the Teutonic territories, and Teutonic officials welcomed and were hiding fugitives from the lands under the rule of the Grand Duke. Then, the Lithuanian ruler addressed the case of arresting of ships with grain by the Teutonic Knights. However, he depicted the affair in a way that was contrary to facts known from other sources. Furthermore, he referred to claims raised against himself and the King of Poland, concerning the lack of progress in spreading the Christian faith in Lithuania. He underlined that a lot had been done in the course of 24 years with regard to that. He also rhetorically asked what progress could be demonstrated by the Order in the territory which the Order held “for more than 200 years,” bearing in mind that there were still numerous Prussians who celebrated pagan rituals. Also in Samogitia ruled by the Teutonic Knights they were said not to bother to spread Christianity among the local population. Finally, the Duke stated that the Order proceeded in a false and treacherous way and ascribed their own faults to others. He therefore decided to support the Samogitians who rebelled against the Teutonic supremacy.24
The other party of the conflict also described their version of events preceding its inflammation. These are the so-called “memorials of the Order” which originated at the end of 1409. However, it was possibly not the only text of that kind that left the Malbork chancery. It was to be distributed at the courts of Christian kings and dukes. It starts with the foundations – as understood by the Teutonic Order – of the relations with Poland and Lithuania, i.e., the peace treaties of Ostrów Saliński (1398) and Raciążek (1404). The Order was said to faithfully follow their provisions and not to spare means and efforts in helping Vytautas in his confrontation with the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. The first disagreements appeared on the occasion of resettling of 250 Samogitians in Lithuania, which was one of the terms of the Raciąż Treaty. According to the relation, the Grand Duke delayed with fulfilling the treaty for reasons known to himself only. This created an inconvenient situation for the Order and the concerned Samogitians. It was i.a. for that reason that on 21 April 1409 the Grand Marshall, the Commanders of Brandenburg and Ragneta as well as the Revee of Samogitia paid a visit to Vytautas. In result of the negotiations, some detailed issues concerning the resettlement were specified. It was in all probability during that meeting that Markward von Salzbach, surprised and perhaps annoyed with incomprehensible conduct of the Lithuanian, decided to talk to him in private about that. In all probability, von Salzbach considered himself to be a proper person to complete this task, as he had maintained personal contacts to the Grand Duke for 18 years. Von Salzbach was said to state (as underlined by the author of the relation – with no malice) that he did not know what the true intentions of Vytautas were. If, however, anyone advised Vytautas to deceive the Order and he indented to proceed that way, he should perhaps remember that he had already done it three times in the past. If he planned to do it again, it would be impossible to conceal it in front of Christian dukes and lords. The Grand Duke felt insulted with these words of the Commander. It was one of the main subjects of his correspondence with the Grand Master. All in all, the end of May came with the uprising in Samogitia, which was a surprise for the Order. Ulrich von Jungingen could not initially believe that Vytautas was responsible for it and even tried to take Vytautas’ advice (with no result) on what to do in such circumstances. Nevertheless, some Samogitian boyars did not want to fight against the Order and requested the Grand Duke to control himself, with no result, either. At that time intense negotiations with the Poles concerning the Samogitian questions commenced. In mid-June the Grand Master made sure that Vytautas was responsible for the uprising (which was in breach of the terms of the Peace of Raciąż). Since then until mid-August the Teutonic party expected in vain Władysław Jagiełło to assume an unambiguous attitude with regard to that. As it was underlined, it was on the attitude of the King and his advisers that further relations of the Order with the Crown and Lithuania would depend. Further on, the authors of the “memorials” depicted the course of the conflict over the ships with grain. It was said to be the following: the Polish monarch gathered a considerable amount of grain in Cuiavia for Vytautas. With consent of the Grand Master and through the intermediacy of the Commander of Toruń the merchants from that town were to transport the grain and other commodities with ships via Prussia to Kaunas. However, when the superior of the Order learned about the treacherous proceeding of the Grand Duke in Samogitia, he ordered to arrest the transport in Ragnita, having informed the King of Poland in advance. It was anyway in the interest of the carriers from the Order’s state, who feared to fall into the hands of enemies. In such a case the Grand Master was said to ask the King of Poland via letter whether the King wished the return of the ships and the commodities which could not reach their destination. Then, Vytautas began to charge the authorities of the Order in writing, claiming that it was in response to the arrest of the transport in Ragneta that he had put his officials in Samogitia where the uprising had spread. The authors of the relation underlined that the claims of the Grand Duke against the Order were untrue, as the sequence of events was different than that stated by the Lithuanian ruler. In the “memorials” there also appeared a charge against the Grand Duke of making alliances with the pagans and the schismatics against the Order. It referred to events from August 1409. 25
What remained to be done was to deliver the arguments that were written in that way to the western European courts. With regard to that, the Polish party marked their activity earlier and to a much broader extent.
Letters of Dietrich von Legendorf, the Teutonic envoy to Henry IV King of England, inform us about the best documented Polish mission to western European courts which took place during the truce. It concerns the mission of Jarosław of Iwno the then Standard-Bearer of Poznań and Starost of Wschowa and the mission of the Royal herald (referred to as Polanlant) who perhaps preceded Iwieński in his travel. The envoy was chosen in a careful manner, as before 1409 Jarosław stayed in western Europe, perhaps taking part in fights against the Moors in Spain. This may be assumed because Jan Długosz refers to Jarosław as miles notabilis Hispanicus26 in his work. Iwieński set out to the West after 9 September 1409, when Władysław II Jagiełło gave him credentials for Charles VI King of France. 27 A coincidence of this date with the time of preparing of the afore-mentioned anti-Teutonic memorials is not a matter of incident. There is no doubt that Jarosław took these memorials with him. Furthermore, it is doubtless that apart from the credentials for the ruler of France, Iwiński also had a series of analogous documents for other European kings and dukes. Apart from France, the mission of Jarosław of Iwno also aimed at reaching England and the courts of all Christian rulers. Information about that was stated in a letter from 30 Octover 1409 to Ulrich von Jungingen by a Neumark nobleman and a faithful co-operator of the Order Heinrich von Günsterberg. He also informed the Grand Master that the Standard-Bearer of Poznań had first (i.e., at the beginning of his journey) paid a visit to the Dukes of Mecklenburg, whom he had given 300 three-score Groschen in order to win them for the King of Poland. 28 There are no relations about the diplomatic activity of Jarosław at the French court. On the other hand, at the turn of 1409 and 1410 the activity of the herald of the Polish King comes to the foreground. Perhaps he preceded the main envoy (i.e., Iwieński), announcing his arrivals and preliminarily informing foreign rules about the matter. It was also important to obtain valid information about the whereabouts of a given ruler, which was crucial with regard to the itinerant system of rule in medieval states. Usually, a letter was sent for this purpose – it was done either by the envoys themselves or by the king who sent them. In the history of European diplomacy it is also testified to that heralds were used for this purpose. They were sent before the members of the proper mission and they did not need a separate safe-conduct. According to a generally accepted custom, sufficient security was provided for them by attributes of their office, with the tabard in the forefront. 29 It is probable that it was the case here.
According to the contents of the afore-mentioned letter of Dietrich von Legendorf to the Grand Master from 20 January 1410, the herald (not mentioned by name) of Władysław Jagiełło arrived to the King of England with a diplomatic mission. The herald’s official name was Polanlant and he was referred to by Dietrich as Pollerlant. It took place on 2 January 1410, as the herald came on the same ship by which a letter from the Grand Master was delivered to Dietrich. Firstly, the envoy gave Henry IV a letter from the King of Poland (perhaps with a request not to support the Teutonic Knights) as well as a letter with complaints against the Order. 30 Pollerlant also orally accused the Teutonic Knights with regard to the Samogitian affair. He gave an example of a Teutonic Knight who was found with the wife of a certain boyar and then was killed. This event was to be a direct cause of the passing of Samogitians from the rule of the Grand Master to Vytautas. However, it was played down by the King. He said that he could not imagine a situation in which he would lose the reign in a land only because one of his knights had been found with another man’s wife.31 The Polish herald probably also spread rumours that the Grand Master had invaded Poland without a prior declaration of war. These statements were concurrently denied by Hans von Lindenau, a nobleman from the Teutonic Order’s state who was present at the English court before and during the war. He confirmed that the Teutonic party had sent the declaration of war, although it had been done reluctantly.32 According to the Teutonic envoy, the Polish herald before his arrival in England was at the courts of Ruprecht King of the Romans, the court of France, in Burgundy, Brabant, Holland, Gelderland, Cleves and in other countries of the Empire.33 Furthermore, Dietrich von Legendorf informed that two other Polish noblemen were on their way to France, including the nobleman Jarosław (identified with Iwieński), who were also supposed to arrive in England. They had four stallions, sent by Władysław Jagiełło to the English ruler. The Teutonic diplomat informed his principal that he would wish the Polish envoy to come, as he would be able to respond to the latter’s charges against the Order in a better way than he had done it in the presence of the herald.34 From the letter of Legendorf we also learn about the course of the previous European itineraries of the herald Pollerlant and Jarosław of Iwno and his unnamed companion.
This European tour of the herald Polanlant (Pollerlant) and Jarosław of Iwno with the other nobleman corresponds to a letter of Ruprecht King of the Romans to the Grand Master. The King informed the recipient about the stay of a knight of the Polish king at his court in Heidelberg. The message from Ruprecht was already a response to the letter of Ulrich von Jungingen, who intended to check incoming news about the presence of the Polish envoys at the court of the King of the Romans. This allows to conclude that the visit of the Polish nobleman at that court took place in Autumn 1409. This unnamed nobleman complained about the Order to Ruprecht. However, the King informed and reassured the Grand Master that there had been good friends of the Order there who had immediately disproved such charges and represented the Teutonic point of view. Apart from that, Ruprecht assured about his intention to hear a possible official mission from the Grand Master and he declared friendship and benevolence towards the Order. 35 An undated letter of the Polish monarch to King Ruprecht, asking him not to believe in false accusations against Poland, probably concerned the response of those representatives of the Order.36 It has been hitherto assumed in scholarship that the letter of the King of the Romans was a proof for a separate Polish mission to the court in Heidelberg. This, however, is disproved by information from Legendorf. According to him, the herald and the nobleman Jarosław stayed at the court of the King of the Romans on their way to England. It seems that the itinerary of both Polish missions went through Mecklenburg and Westphalia, and then through Cleves, Gelderland, Holland and Brabant. There, it turned to the south-west to Heidelberg in Palatinate, where Ruprecht resided, and it went farther off via Burgundy to France and then to England.
There can be no doubt that also in these countries the Polish envoys presented Royal letters and other propaganda materials, aiming at acquiring the benevolence of local rulers. These activities brought some results, as it can be inferred from the comment in the chronicle of the Official of Pomesania. With regard to a mention on the heir of Iwno having been taken prisoner by the Teutonic Knights in 1410 and to negotiations on his release, it was said that the prisoner had done a lot of harm to the Order “at the courts of the lords of the German lands.”37
The Teutonic response to the Polish diplomatic activities was the afore-mentioned mission of Dietrich von Legendorff, the nobleman from the land of Chełmno and the courtier (Diener) of the Grand Master, and his companions Liffard von Hervorden Provost of Elbląg and Johann Krolow Provost of Gdańsk. Being already on the spot, they made use of the help from other comers from Prussia: Hans von Lindenau and Johann Schellendorf. The presence of this mission in England is testified to already in August 1409 and its proper objective was to settle controversies and the receipt of previously determined sums of compensations from the King of England for Hanseatic towns under the rule of the Teutonic Order.38 The issue of the Polish-Teutonic conflict appeared relatively late in the activity of the Order’s diplomats. On 2 January 1410 during the audience at the Royal residence in Eltham they gave the English monarch a letter from the Grand Master with a request for military help against Poland. With regard to that Dietrich managed to obtain a promise from Henry IV who said that he would eagerly support the Order in the war and ever personally participated in it, if he were in peaceful relations with the French. He also underlined that he considered himself “a child of Prussia.” This resulted from his involvement into Teutonic forays in Lithuania already before his coming to the throne. 39 The King, won by Dietrich von Legendorf, was much eager to cooperate, as he allowed the Teutonic envoy to make copies of the letters from Władysław II Jagiełło and Aleksander Vytautas and other propaganda writings delivered by the Polish mission of the herald Pollerlant and Jarosław of Iwno. Legendorf ordered 12 articles obtained from the Grand Master to be translated from German into Latin and prepared written responses to Polish charges.40 It was to a degree due to Dietrich’s activity that the Polish envoys were received in a not very favourable manner by the King of England (see above). However, in his letters to the Grand Master Dietrich von Legendorf expressed his anxiety about the diplomatic activity of the Polish mission at other European courts. He intended to go to these countries immediately after leaving England and to counteract the results of the propaganda action of the Polish envoys.41 He planned to set out on the journey immediately after 2 February 1410, when he expected to receive another instalment of the English money.42 It took, however, longer than expected and the money was given to the Teutonic diplomats on 1 March 1410, already in Bruges.43 There is no doubt that Dietrich von Legendorf himself took the money, as he also received desiderata from German merchants from this town, to be delivered to Willem VI Count of Holland and to the Grand Master. It was therefore after that day that the Teutonic envoys set out to Prussia, paying visits to European courts on their way. Already before that the envoy advised his principal to have letters prepared, which would defend the position of the Order in order to counteract the propaganda overtones of the manifestos of Władysław Jagiełło and Vytautas. He also encouraged the Grand Master to fulfil the requests of Henry IV who was benevolent towards the Order. Henry IV wanted two ships with grain to be sent to England. 44 Eventually, it did not came to a closer cooperation between the Teutonic Knights and England due to excessive demands of the subjects of the English King. They demanded trade privileges in Prussia and Livonia, which was unacceptable for the great Prussian towns. Dietrich von Legensdorf was also against fulfilling the demands of the English.45
It seems that, apart from envoys coming directly from the Teutonic Order’s state, who acted upon the order of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, a considerable role in the propaganda battle in the West of Europe (especially in the Empire) was played by numerous Teutonic bailiwicks. However, there are no sufficient source data which would enable the researcher to examine the actual scope of their activity in the period in question.
Political alliances made by the Teutonic Knights were more factual. Among them, the alliance with Sigismund of Luxembourg King of Hungary and Vicar General of the Empire no doubt comes to the foreground. In October 1409 a preliminary of a mutual alliance was decided upon. It stipulated that this monarch would join the war on the side of the Teutonic Order if reasons leading to his joining were “just and honest before God and the world.”46 In exchange for his active involvement the Order obliged to pay the King of Hungary 300 000 florins on 24 June 1410 in Frankfurt (Oder). Sigismund was to attack the Kingdom of Poland in the most convenient place and at the most convenient time, after a prior consultation with the Grand Master. The Teutonic Knights obliged to finance the pay for mercenaries, with 10 000 lances (i.e., c. 30 000 armed men) to be hired by Sigismund. The monthly pay was to be 24 florins per lance. In case of victorious war, in exchange for war losses and expenses, the Teutonic Knights were to receive Lithuania, Samogitia and the land of Dobrzyń, and perhaps Cuiavia as well.47 As the full text of the preliminary of the treaty did not survive, it is unknown what territorial acquisitions were to come to the King of Hungary at the expense of Poland. These probably included (Crown) Ruthenia, Podolia and Moldavia, which accepted the Polish suzerainty.48 The preliminary of the treaty is to be considered very beneficial for Sigismund of Luxembourg, taking possible territorial acquisitions into consideration. This is because he gained considerable financial profits and his mercenaries were to be paid by the Order. Furthermore, the basic condition of his joining the war was formulated in such a way that the King of Hungary was able to decide himself when he would join the war. It enabled him not to fulfil the provisions of the treaty should he consider the reasons for the war insufficiently “just.”  
The alliance was finally made as late as 20 December 1409 in Buda, in the presence of the plenipotentiaries of the Grand Master: Werner von Tettingen Grand Hospitaller and Commander of Elbląg and Albrecht von Schwarzburg Commander of Toruń. The contents of the alliance differed from provisions stipulated in the preliminary, and first of all they were more concise. Sigismund obliged to give military support to the Order in the case of participation of “pagans” (which encompassed the Lithuanians, the Tartars, the Ruthenians and “other schismatics”) on the Polish side. The King of Hungary also agreed to restore all the lands to the Order which were taken away from it by the Polish monarch. Furthermore, Sigismund promised not to make peace without the knowledge of the Grand Master.49 The final alliance seemed to be much less convenient for Sigismund than the preliminary. It did not give him an opportunity to withdraw from the war, as the condition of his joining the war had already been fulfilled. The “pagans” as understood in the treaty, i.e., all the Lithuanians, the Samogitians and the Tartars as subjects and allies of Aleksander Vytautas, already participated in the war on the Polish-Lithuanian side, analogously to the “schismatics.” Therefore, in the light of accepted obligation, Sigismund of Luxembourg should start hostilities when the October truce expired. Financial subsidies for Sigismund and financing of the mercenaries of the King of Hungary by the Grand Master were not mentioned, either. This is why it is correctly assumed in scholarship that Sigismund was to wage the war at his own expense.50 These stipulations were accompanied by a gesture of friendship and underlining of close relations of the Hungarian King with the Order – the Teutonic envoys were requested to be the godfathers of Princess Elisabeth, daughter of Sigismund and Barbara of Cilly.51
Territorial acquisitions of the Hungarian king in the event of victorious war were specified in the instrument of ratification of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, which confirmed the alliance. The instrument was generally consistent with the charter of Sigismund (the principal of the Order confirmed the alliance, as it was made by his plenipotentiaries). If during the war the Teutonic troops seized Ruthenia, Podolia, Moldavia or other territories of the “infidels,” which were taken away from the Kingdom of Hungary by Poland, Ulrich von Jungingen obliged to give them to Sigismund. Analogously to the Hungarian King, the Grand Master was not to make a separate peace with the Poles without the knowledge and consent of his ally.52 It is worth stressing that the ratification of the alliance with Sigismund took place as late as 31 March 1410, i.e., after the failed arbitration before Wenceslaus IV and before the negotiations in Kežmarok (Késmárk).
In spite of his declarations and gestures of friendship, Sigismund of Luxembourg did not think eagerly of participation in the war. This is testified to by his vivid involvement into attempts at peacefully settling the controversy of the Polish-Lithuanian Union with the Teutonic Knights after the afore-mentioned verdict in Wrocław (8 February). It is also pointed out by the organisation of the April convention in Kežmarok (Késmárk). Preliminary steps with regard to that were already undertaken in February by Herman Count of Cilly. Initially, a convention of both rulers was planned, but eventually Władysław Jagiełło stayed in Nowy Sącz and Vytautas went to Kežmarok (Késmárk) substituting for him. It did not come to any breakthrough in the negotiations. Furthermore, making use of the King’s absence, Sigismund of Luxembourg offered the Lithuanian crown to Vytautas, hoping for a breach of the union of Poland and Lithuania. The envoys of the Grand Master (again Werner von Tettingen and Albrecht von Schwarzburg) assisted in the negotiations.53
Polski i Litwy. Anyway, it was agreed that the negotiations would continue. It was planned that Sigismund himself would go to Prussia as the mediator (the chancery of Władysław Jagiełło even issued a safe-conduct for him). Eventually, in May 1410 a mission set out on the journey. Its members were Miklós Garai Palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary, Ścibor of Ściborze and Beckov Palatine of Transylvania and Christoph von Gersdorff. The mission attempted at mediating between the conflicting parties even after the military activities had been resumed.54
One could probably propose many reasons for the “peacemaking” attitude of the King of Hungary after the failed Kežmarok (Késmárk) convention. It seems, however, that the situation in the Empire was of crucial significance. On 18 May 1410 Palatine Ruprecht, the hitherto King of the Romans and the rival of Wenceslaus IV died. All the Luxembourgs undertook steps aimed at taking over this title. Finally, a minor part of the electors elected Sigismund for the King of the Romans on 20 September 1410 in Frankfurt am Main. The election, however, did not fulfil formal requirements. The majority of the electors made a new choice on 1 October, and Jost Margrave of Moravia, Sigismund’s paternal cousin was elected. Jost left the formal title of the Emperor to his ally Wenceslaus IV, who renounced the title of the King of the Romans before the election.55 Sigismund’s efforts for the Roman crown in Summer 1410 explain well his military passiveness towards the conflict in Prussia in its decisive phase. Furthermore, Hungarian magnates and nobility were perhaps not very enthusiastic about the war with Poland, as undertaking military activities would mean a breach of the peace of 1397, which was to be valid until 1413.56 It will also be recalled that several closest Hungarian collaborators of Sigismund had close ties to Poland. Ścibor Palatine of Transylvania was Polish and he held substantial land estates in the Crown. Miklós Garai Palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary became connected by marriage to the Płock line of the Masovian Piasts.57 Furthermore, it also seems of importance that Sigismund and Władysław Jagiełło were close relatives by marriage: the wives of both of them came from the kin of the Counts of Cilly. Members of this kin were also among the most important collaborators of Sigismund in Hungary.58
The Polish ruler, on the other hand, attempted at gaining supporters in other areas. The making of a pact between Władysław Jagiełło and Mircea the Elder, Prince of Wallachia (Bessarabia) is to be seen in this context. This fact is testified to by the charter issued by the Polish ruler on 6 February 1410 in Jedlnia, in which Władysław obliged to keep the agreement made with the Prince. The contents of this agreement, however, were not specified.59 Therefore, we do not know whether the pact concerned military cooperation or against whom the parties were to cooperate in a military manner. It cannot be excluded, however, that it was first of all directed against Sigismund of Luxembourg, who posed a military threat both for Poland (as the formal ally of the Teutonic Order’s state since 20 December 1409) and Wallachia. The latter was due to the fact that the Wallachian Prince was not on very good terms with Hungary at that time and was seriously involved to the south of the Danube into a dynastic conflict in the Turkish state. The document of the treaty with Poland, issued by Mircea on 17 May 1411, specified that the military cooperation of both states was to concern a conflict with Sigismund only. With regard to other enemies, the parties were supposed to reach another agreement.60 It is therefore difficult to be absolutely certain whether Mircea sent Władysław II Jagiełło any auxiliary troops who might have participated in the Summer expedition to Prussia in 1410. If such a support was actually sent, it was rather symbolic anyway.61
Military aid to the Polish-Lithuanian Union against the Teutonic Knights in the course of the Summer campaign of 1410 was also given by the pretender to the Khan’s Throne of the Golden Horde, Jalal-ad-Din, the son of Tokhtamysh. At that time (since the early Spring of 1409) he stayed in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and was considered an ally both by Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Duke Vytautas. This is proved by his participation in the meeting of the paternal cousins in Brześć upon the River Bug, held in November 1409. 62
It is also known that in 1410 a Meissen magnate Johann III the lord of Cottbus intended to come and support Władysław Jagiełło with 40 lances of armed men. It was said to be with consent of one of the local Margraves (Friedrich IV, Wilhelm II or Friedrich the Younger). It is unknown, however, whether the Margraves themselves also lent military aid to Poland, as they were obliged by the treaty of alliance made by their predecessor Wilhelm I.63 Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that Wilhelm II considered his duties fulfilled by means of giving consent for the expedition of Johann.
Concerning the Papacy’s attitude towards the war of Poland and Lithuania with the Teutonic Knights, it was mainly influenced by events related to attempts at overcoming the Great Western Schism in the course of proceedings of the Council of Pisa. Paradoxically, these attempts resulted in an even more profound division in the Latin Church. Namely, the Council of Pisa elected the new Pope Alexander V (26 June 1409). This, however, was not accepted by the hitherto Roman Pope Gregory XII and by his Avignon counterpart Benedict XIII.64 All three Popes devoted therefore most of their efforts to their obediences being acknowledged by particular European monarchs, with the decisive game being played between Rome and Pisa. From the very beginning the activity of the Council of Pisa and the new Pope Alexander V was acknowledged by the Teutonic Order, represented there by the procurator Peter von Wormditt (of Orneta).65 Władysław Jagiełło and the Polish Church assumed a more reserved attitude, but yet in 1409 decided to choose the obedience of Alexander. The clergy accepted his supremacy at the Synod of Łęczyca in October, and the King sent his letter of obedience probably at the end of 1409. 66 The eventual choice of Alexander V at the expense of Gregory XII seems to have partially resulted from current needs of the Polish policy related to the war against the Order. The Pisa Pope was personally known to Władysław Jagiełło due to the former’s missionary activity in the Grand Duchy in the first half of the 1370s. Jan Długosz even said that he spoke the “Slavonic language.” 67 The Polish monarch therefore counted for his benevolence during the armed confrontation with the Teutonic Knights. Anyway, the acknowledgement of the Pisa obedience by Władysław Jagiełło prevented the “Papal” argument from being used by the Order. Due to previous experiences of Alexander V, it also gave hope for beneficial steps of the Papal Curia with regard to the conflict of Poland and Lithuania with the Order. In order, however, to fulfil these expectations, active policy at the Papal court was to be conducted. This task was to be completed by Polish clergymen-intellectuals in the entourage of Pope Alexander V and after his death, of the new “Pisa” Pope John XXIII. According to sources dating either from the period before the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) or immediately after it, the following persons (in order of appearance) stayed at the Papal Curia: Piotr Wolfram (until the end of 1409), Adam of Będków, Piotr Boleścic, Paweł Włodkowic, Piotr of Kobylin and Paweł of Czechów.68 It was perhaps due to their activity (and a positive attitude of the Pope towards Władysław Jagiełło, resulting from their acquaintance in the time of the former’s missionary activity in Lithuania) that Alexander V displayed interest in the conflict, sending a letter (dated from Bologna on 23 January 1410) to the Grand Master (and perhaps also to the King), calling him to make peace. Also the Teutonic diplomats (who acknowledged the Pisa obedience from the very beginning) remained vigilant, as the letter was delivered by Peter von Wormditt (of Orneta), the Order’s procurator at the Papal court, who acted as the Papal legate.69 These requests, however, brought no result. Pope Alexander V died on 3 May 1410, and his successor, John XXXIII, who was elected by the Council of Pisa on 18 May 1410, did not undertake any political steps related to the conflict before the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg). This was related to the oncoming expiry of the truce and renewal of hostilities.70 The Polish King also demonstrated considerable activity in maintaining contacts with favourably oriented high Ecclesiastical dignitaries from the entourage of the Pope, by means of sending letters to them.71
To sum up, the balance of military interstate alliances in 1409-1410 seemed to be more profitable for the Order. Based on them, the Order acquired military support (although only of declarative nature in some cases) from all the Dukes of Western Pomerania and Sigismund of Luxembourg King of Hungary. On the other hand, the Teutonic Knights did not manage to make any other formal alliances. They were no doubt disappointed by the attitude of the most important rulers (apart from Sigismund) in the Empire: Ruprecht Palatine of the Rhine and King of the Romans (although he died already in May 1410), Wenceslaus IV and Jost of Luxembourg. The Order did not receive any real support from them in the decisive phase of the war. In 1409-1410 the most prominent princes of the Empire were definitely more interested in their internal affairs than in the conflict of the Teutonic Order with Poland and Lithuania. They did make propaganda use of this conflicts, but for their own purposes only. Moreover, it must be added that neither Wenceslaus nor Jost did not forbid the recruitment of mercenaries by the Polish party in their realms. This seems to suggest that they did not have any special fondness for the Teutonic Knights. The Papacy, as mentioned above, was in a similar position to that of the Empire in 1409 and 1410, as Gregory XII was first rivalled by Alexander V and after the latter’s death by John XXIII.
Therefore, suggestions of some researchers about the hostile encirclement of Poland from the west and the south in the first half of 1410 seem to go too far.72 It was only Sigismund as the King of Hungary and only two out of three Dukes of Pomerania (after Bogusław VIII had withdrawn from the pact with the Order) who remained in the alliance with the Teutonic Knights. Bohemia, ruled by Wenceslaus IV, Moravia, ruled by Jost and Brandenburg and Lower Lusatia, under the actual rule of the latter, remained actually passive towards the conflict.73 Alliances made by the Teutonic Order, which were few and of minor significance, resulted in the quality of the support for the Order during the Summer campaign. The Order was actually supported by only one banner from Western Pomerania and one of a Silesian Duke. This support for the Order was at least counterbalanced with auxiliary troops for the Polish party: the Moldavians, the Tartars and perhaps one banner of a Hungarian Bishop Tamás of Nyitraludány (Ludanice), who remained in opposition to Sigismund. Sigismund himself did not lend any aid to the Teutonic Knights, either, as he was occupied with his efforts for the throne of the King of the Romans and troubles in the south of Hungary. He was able to fulfil his duties as the ally only after 24 October 1410. It is worth stressing that neither in the first phase of the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Union nor during the Grunwald (Tannenberg) expedition Ulrich von Jungingen could count on the Livonian branch of the Order. Due to the fact that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania gained decisive political advantage in the territory of North-Western Ruthenia in 1404-1408, the Livonian branch made a treaty of peace with Vytautas with three months’ notice. The treaty was prolonged on 26 May 1410.74 In result of these activities the Polish-Lithuanian Union secured peace on the part of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy (September 1408). The balance of political preparations for the decisive phase of the conflict in Summer 1410 seems therefore to be equivalent for both parties.  
Diplomatic activities of both parties of the conflict gained in intensity again after the renewal of hostilities and after the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg). The Order found itself in a new situation and had to concentrate its efforts on gaining help which would enable it to survive the greatest crisis in its history. On the other hand, Poland and Lithuania were forced to search for means of neutralising the impression the defeat of the Teutonic army and the death of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, of the majority of the Teutonic dignitaries and numerous brethren knights  made on the opinion of Christian Europe. Therefore, vivid propaganda activity took place in the post-Grunwald (Tannenberg) period. It was first of all notable in correspondence sent by both parties of the conflict. It was due to the fact that ongoing military activities and a rapid pace of changes hardly left any time for sending official missions, which would present the arguments of the parties to the international opinion. A propaganda preparation of the Polish party were letters sent by King Władysław Jagiełło the day after the battle. They were addressed to Queen Anna, Mikołaj Kurowski Archbishop of Gniezno and Wojciech Jastrzębiec Bishop of Poznań. The contents of these letters were very similar: they underlined the fact that the King heard the mass before the battle, and they described the sending of two swords by the Grand Master before the battle. Their also mentioned low casualties on the part of the Allies, the death of the Order’s superior and great numbers of prisoners.  The letters were in all probably edited by Vice-Chancellor Mikołaj Trąba who stayed with the King all the time and was mentioned in the relation formula of these letters.75 In all probability these were not the only letters sent from the battlefield. They were carried by Mikołaj Morawiec, the valet of the Royal chamber. As a sign of victory, he took with him the standard of the Bishop of Pomesania, which was captured in battle. In spite of the fact that the afore-mentioned letters were addressed at local recipients, copies of these writings soon got abroad, being an important factor of the Polish propaganda in the post-Grunwald (Tannenberg) period. As early as the end of July 1410 a copy of the letter to Wojciech Jastrzębiec was sent by him to Bologna, where the afore-mentioned Polish clergymen stayed at the court of Pope John XXIII (in Summer 1410, i.a. Paweł Włodkowic and Adam of Będków were present there). Jastrzębiec also sent them his own writing, where particular stress was put on the issue of the presence of the schismatics and the infidels in the Royal army. He used arguments presented by Stanisław of Skarbimierz in his sermon “On just wars” (De bellis justis). The addressees were to present these arguments to the cardinals and even to the Pope himself. In August 1409 the contents of the letter to Queen Anna were known in Venice, which rivalled with the Teutonic ally Sigismund of Luxembourg in the Balkans.76
The propaganda activity in the Royal chancery was also aimed at the Order’s subjects, with the hope of their leaving their hitherto lords. The day after the battle the King sent a letter to Toruń and other towns in the land of Chełmno with the relation of the victory and a call to acknowledge his rule, so that the Royal troops did not have to plunder their property and estates. Two months thereafter a letter to Johann Rymann Bishop of Pomesania was prepared. The King announced his intention to found a nunnery of the Bridgettine Order in the battlefield of Grunwald (Tannenberg), which lay in the diocese of Pomesania. The patron of the order, St Bridget of Sweden († 1373) prophesied the defeat of the Teutonic Order in her revelations. Therefore, referring to her in the post-Grunwald (Tannenberg) period had a defined political and propaganda aspect. The initiative, however, was not fulfilled due to the changing course of the war.77 In November 1410 a Royal letter to a Bohemian lord Jindřich of Rožmberk was written. The letter does not focus on the battle itself, but offers a systematised presentation of the Polish version of events which led to the war and of the course of the war. It mentioned all the injustice and injuries done to Władysław Jagiełło since his baptism. The sender also underlined his constant aims at maintaining peace and stressed the treachery of the Teutonic Knights, who ruthlessly attached the lands of Dobrzyń and Nakło at the beginning of the war. The description of the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) is preceded by a justification of the King because of the presence of the schismatics and the pagans in his troops. Jagiełło underlined that it was a commonplace to make use of their services. Furthermore, he requested the Bohemian magnate not to believe the accusations stipulated against him by the Teutonic party.78 A Polish memorial also reached the University of Prague, where it was benevolently accepted by at least part of the academic milieu. A response was sent at the end of 1410 by Jan Hus. He declared his delight with the Polish victory. He stressed that the conceit of the Teutonic Knights, who had rested their hopes in their weapons, horses and wealth, had been punished (Where are the two swords of the enemies? – a reference to the two swords which were given to the King by the heralds present in the Teutonic army). On the other hand, he called the King to make peace, especially with Sigismund of Luxembourg.79 A letter from August 1410 is also significant. It was sent by Błażej Szczepanowic of Jankowice (related to the Kraków Academy) to Dietrich of Nieheim, a historian and an official of the Papal chancery. The sender provided the influential clerk of the Curia with an image of the King who aimed at maintaining peace at any price. This was contrasted with ruthless proceedings of the Teutonic Knights with the neophytes and the population of the conquered land of Dobrzyń. The Polish clergyman also described a fairly recent event of 1410, when the Teutonic Knights were said to make a straw effigy of Władysław Jagiełło. Then, they dragged it through the mud and finally beheaded it. Furthermore, he described the Grunwald (Tannenberg) victory, which he considered a God-sent compensation for earlier injuries suffered by the Poles. He concluded the letter with information about the siege of Malbork and about numerous Prussian castles and towns which acknowledged the suzerainty of the Polish ruler.80
Obviously, propaganda and diplomatic activities were also undertaken by the Teutonic party. This first of all concerns letters sent in July from besieged Malbork by Heinrich von Plauen Commander of Świece who was acting as the Grand Master. Firstly, a week after the clash at Grunwald (Tannenberg), i.e., on 22 July 1410, a general letter to all the Christian rulers was sent. It contained information about the capital of the Order in Prussia being besieged by the entire power of the King of Poland and Duke Vytautas with “infidel Saracens” and the request for support. After some days – on 28 July – Heinrich von Plauen sent a letter to Konrad von Elgoffstein, the superior of the Order in the German lands. He reminded that the Teutonic Knights had accepted the arbitration verdict of Wencleslaus IV, as opposed to the other party. He also informed about the Grunwald (Tannenberg) defeat. Obviously, he asked for support and for turning to other rulers for help. The Commander  of Świecie guaranteed pays for those eager to participate in the Prussian expedition. In response to this manifesto, Konrad von Egloffstein addressed the Teutonic bailiwicks in Germany in mid-August, describing the events and calling the addressees to both offer support themselves and encourage their “relatives and neighbours” to do so.81 Almost parallel to that the Teutonic Knights informed their ally Sigismund of Luxembourg King of Hungary and Vicar of the Empire. Already on 8 August 1410 Sigismund sent a letter to the society of Prussia and to Gdańsk, stating that he had already been told about the death of the Grand Master in the battle with “the pagans, the infidels and their supporters.” He requested the addressees to remain faithful to the Order and assured them that he would soon come with support. The Hungarian King also sent manifestos to western Europe. The most important one is the letter sent on 20 August 1410 to “all the rulers and lords, kings, dukes, margraves, prelates, counts, barons, burgraves, knights, squires and nobles, and all other worshippers of Christ’s Cross and the faithful.” Sigismund of Luxembourg informed them about the death of Ulrich von Jungingen and other dignitaries of the Order in the battle with innumerable hosts of “the Lithuanians, the Samogitians, the Ruthenians, and other known enemies and persecutors of Christ’s Cross and the entire Christian religion.” He requested everyone to immediately set out to Prussia and lend aid to the Teutonic Knights, as he intended to do personally. Such a determined attitude of Sigismund of Luxembourg was favoured by the situation in the Empire, where the rivalry for the Roman crown after the death of Ruprecht in May 1410 entered its final stage. A strong verbal involvement in the case of the Teutonic Order could result in the electors’ benevolence.82 His letter and possibly other related correspondence found their resonance in the contemporary public opinion. They found their way to monuments of historiography, which depict the Prussian affair in the favourable light for the Order. One particularly needs to mention such contemporary texts as the chronicle of an anonymous monk of Saint-Denis or the work of a Burgundian nobleman Enguerran de Monstrelet.83 The Teutonic party was also very active at the court of Wenceslaus IV King of Bohemia and of the Romans. As early as 20 August 1410 Beneš of Donin, one of the most prominent Bohemian lords, wrote to Heinrich von Plauen and assured him that both Wenceslaus IV and Jost Margrave of Moravia would come with aid “with all their lords, knights and squires.” The same would be done by the Silesian dukes. These declarations were slightly later repeated personally by Wenceslaus and Jost, who said that they would set out against “the pagans and the infidels.” This correspondence and the Teutonic efforts resulted in a letter of Konrad von Egloffstein, sent in September 1410 to Johannes von Nassau Archbishop of Mainz. The German Land-master requested the knights from the Archbishop’s lands who were eager to save the Christianity to come to Würzburg on 20 October.84 This entire action no question contributed to the success of the Teutonic recruitment action in the Empire in Autumn 1410.
Elaborated arguments were given by the new Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen in his memorial to the western European rulers in December 1410. Apart from information on the course of the failed convention with Władysław Jagiełło in Raciążek, which took place shortly before that date, von Plauen stated that the defeat of the Teutonic Order was a threat for entire Christian Europe. The Grand Master called for help from the western European chivalry and reminded that for many years the Order had been a haven for those of noble birth.85 In mid-January 1411 Heinrich von Plauen sent a letter to Wenceslaus IV. He stressed his efforts towards the peace, undertaken under the influence of advice from “dukes, lords, knights and squires, who were with us for the sake of defence of the Christian faith.” In the meantime, the King of Poland constantly infringed the truce, contrary to his own declarations and obligations. He also constantly augmented his forces. According to the author of the letter, Władysław Jagiełło intended to invade Prussia again and completely annihilate the Order. Finally, Heinrich von Plauen requested the King of Bohemia and of the Romans to take the contents of the letter to heart and consider them. He also said that the participation in the Prussian expedition was to secure the absolution of sins for the combatants, as it was inferred by the Grand Master from Papal privileges for the Order. A letter with analogous contents was sent at the same time to other Christian rulers, not mentioned with names.86 It must be remembered that the involvement of the Luxembourg rulers in the Polish-Teutonic conflict was chiefly a “pre-election declaration” in the face of the afore-mentioned rivalry for the Roman throne.
The war of Poland and Lithuania with the Teutonic Order ended after several rounds of negotiations with a peace treaty made in Toruń on 1 February 1411. With regard to territorial matters it basically respected the status quo ante principle. An exception was made, however, for the key matter of Samogitia. It should remain in the hands of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Duke Vytautas as their lifetime possession, and then it should return under the rule of the Order. The ratification of the treaty by means of exchange of main documents took place during the convention of the representatives of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen at the border River Drwęca on 10 May 1411.87 Nevertheless, the efforts towards revising the provisions of the peace treaty are particularly noticeable in the activities of the Polish-Lithuanian party. This was clearly manifested in the attitude of the Polish negotiators during the convention in Cuiavia in September 1411. According to the provisions of the treaty, it was to be devoted to the settlement of current controversies. The Polish delegates, however, presented a long list of claims of various nature, sometimes concerning events from before some dozen years. It was evidently in contrast to Art. 1 of the Treaty of Toruń.88 Therefore, both parties undertook continuous activities in the international arena, attempting at presenting and justifying their positions. An important voice was a speech of doctor of decrees Andrzej Łaskarzyc, the member of the mission which arrived to Pope John XXIII. After introductory praises for the Pope, Łaskarzyc depicted the circumstances of the conflict with the Teutonic Order. He stressed the involvement of Władysław Jagiełło towards maintaining peace and called up the scene of sending of the two swords by the Grand Master and the singing of the “Bogurodzica” (Mother of God) by the Polish knights. The King was portrayed as an ideal Christian ruler by the speaker: “Therefore, the land of Poland is blessed, whose King is so wise.” Andrzej Laskarzyc (with the help of Michał Blida Canon of Poznań) was also the main author of the Polish position, which was given a form of 81 articles, before the beginning of the Polish-Teutonic trial before Sigismund of Luxembourg King of the Romans and of Hungary in 1412. He charged the Teutonic Knights with the infringement of terms of the Peace of Toruń and he gave evidence for the rights of the Kingdom to Pomerania and the lands of Chełmno and Michałów. First of all, the Polish party claimed that the dukes and the kings of Poland were the founders of the Order and due to this they had the right of suzerainty over it. Therefore, the Teutonic Knights had no right to ignore the rulers of Poland while making efforts for various Imperial and Papal privileges in the past. As a consequence, Łaskarzyc considered such privileges as obtained under false pretences by the monks and thus invalid. In this way, such theses were presented for the first time and they were later repeated and developed by the representatives of the Kingdom in the subsequent controversies with the Teutonic Knights.89 At this stage of the controversy the knights in habits definitely found themselves in the defensive. In their arguments they only blamed the Poles and the Lithuanians with breaching the terms of the Peace of Toruń, especially of its Art. 1. It stipulated the nullification of all earlier controversies and conflicts and its infringement was to be considered a defamation of the Order. Furthermore, the Teutonic Knights charged their adversaries with illicit detention of prisoners of the last war and infringement of the freedom of trade. Sigismund of Luxembourg did not issue a decisive verdict and he ordered his envoy Benedict of Macra to carry out additional investigation. The trial before Sigismund enabled both parties to further specify their positions. Andrzej Łaskarzyc broadened the repertoire of arguments for the rights of the Kingdom to Pomorze and the lands of Chełmno and Michałów. He reminded of the fact that the verdict of the Papal judges in 1339 had adjudged these territories to Poland. In order to find evidence in support of his theses, this scholar conducted a broad-scale research in the Royal Treasury and in various ecclesiastical archives. The results were, however, rather modest. On the other hand, it was quite innovative that the Polish plenipotentiary made use of the map, which took place while delimiting the border between the district of Nakło and Teutonic Pomerania. It was there that Andrzej Łaskarzyc demonstrated “a certain chart, containing the limits of the Kingdom in the part called the Nakło part, i.e., Krajna” to the envoy of Sigismund of Luxembourg. Nevertheless, with regard to documents held, the Teutonic party had a decisive advantage. The plenipotentiary of Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen, an excellent lawyer Kaspar Schuwenpflug, produced copies of 16 charters issued by the Popes and the Emperors in the 13th and the 14th c. and by the Lithuanian King Mindaugas in the mid-13th c. when proving the Teutonic Order’s rights to one of the castles in Samogitia. The Poles questioned again the honesty of the Teutonic Knights when making efforts for these privileges. Łaskarzyc carried out a critical examination of the authenticity of the charters and charged the monks with forgery in some cases (especially with regard to the charters of Mindaugas). The Polish scholar also maintained that the Teutonic Knights had lied while saying that they had been fighting for the faith. This was because they could not convert anyone due to their illiteracy, ignorance of the Bible and even of grammar. It was also for the first time that Łaskarzyc acknowledged the rights of the pagan to posses material wealth and their own states. This was related to concepts created by St Thomas Aquinas and accepted by the Papacy (especially by Innocent IV). The Teutonic Knights did not accept the final verdict of Benedict of Macra and the further course of the trial before Sigismund of Luxembourg yielded no results, either.90
Diplomatic and propaganda activities during the war of 1409-1411 enabled the Polish-Lithuanian case to emerge in the international arena. At the same time they were a prelude to the major clash of the conflicting parties in this field in the later period – from the second half of 1411 onwards, and especially during the Council of Constance. They also demonstrated that the Polish-Lithuanian state was perfectly able to find its way in the rituals and habits of late medieval European diplomacy.

1 The political situation of the 1380s, including the consequences of the Krewo Treaty for the relations with the Teutonic Order has been discussed by, i.a., H. Gersdorf, Der Deutsche Orden im Zeitalter der polnisch – litauischen Union. Die Amtszeit des Hochmeisters Konrad Zöllner von Rotenstein (1382-1390), Marburg/Lahn 1957; Z. H. Nowak, Dyplomacja polska w czasach Jadwigi i Władysława Jagiełły (1382-1434) (Polish diplomacy in the times of Jadwiga and Władysław Jagiełło (1382-1434), in: Historia dyplomacji polskiej (History of Polish diplomacy), vol. I, ed. by M. Biskup, Warszawa 1980, pp. 299-393; A. Czacharowski, Rola króla Władysława Jagiełły w pertraktacjach polsko – krzyżackich przed wielką wojną (The role of King Władysław Jagiełło in the Polish-Teutonic negotiations before the Great War), Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici, Historia XXIV, Toruń 1990, pp. 51-71; J. Krzyżaniakowa, J. Ochmański, Władysław II Jagiełło, Wrocław 1990.

2 Codex diplomaticus Prussicus, ed. by J. Voigt, vol. IV, Königsberg 1853, No. 38: der vorgenante Jagail, der sich vor eynen kunig heldet zcu Polan.

3 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika dyplomacji polskiej w stosunkach z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach w latach 1386-1454 (Organisation and technique of Polish diplomacy in the relations with the Teutonic Order in Prussia in 1386-1454), Toruń 2009, pp. 124-125.

4 Die Chronik Wigands von Marburg, ed. by T. Hirsch, Appendix IIb, in: Scriptores rerum Prussicarum (henceforth as: SRP), vol. II, Leipzig 1863, p. 715: after the baptism and the coronation, the Teutonic Knights were said to address him nicht mit unszm rechten namen, der uns von der touffe ist gegeben, sunder ir habt unszn namen czu rockeczoge czogen und uns Jagal genant und ouch uns: du Jagal genant in uwern briefen mit hochfertigen mute, durch den willen nicht alleine unsz mut sunder der ganczen gemeinheit ist besweret.

5 Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum, 1st ed., ed. by T. Działyński, vol. II, Poznań 1854, p. 185: Inclito viro Jagelloni se gerenti pro rege Polonie; see also H. Gersdorf, Der Deutsche Orden, p. 83.

6 In January 1388 near Toruń it came to the first known Polish-Teutonic convention during the rule of Władysław Jagiełło – A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 357.

7 S. Jóźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409-1411 (War of Poland and Lithuania against the Teutonic Order in 1409-1411), Malbork 2010 (henceforth as: Wojna 1409-1411), pp. 52-69, 117-120.

8 K. Dürschner, Der wacklige Thron. Politische Opposition im Reich von 1378 bis 1438, Frankfurt/Main 2003, pp. 210-211.

9 Franciscani Thoruniensis Annales Prussici 941-1410, ed. by E. Strehlke, SRP, vol. III, Leipzig 1866, p. 311.

10 Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, lib. X-XI, ed. by K. Baczkowski et al., Warszawa 1997 (henceforth as: Długosz X/XI), p. 50.

11 Franciscani Thorunensis, pp. 311–312.

12 Lucas David, Preussische Chronik, ed. by E. Hennig, D. F. Schütz, vol. VIII, Königsberg, p. 189 (German version); Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici ex Tabularii Regii Berolinensis codice potissimum, ed. by E. Strehlke, Berlin 1869, No. 289 (Latin version)

13 Johann’s von Posilge, officialis von Pomesanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen (henceforth as: Posilge), ed. by E. Strehlke, SRP, vol. III, p. 312; cf. Wojna 1409-1411, p. 178.

14 No original of the relevant charter survived and the extant copies (Lucas David, Preussische Chronik, vol. VIII, p. 189; Tabulae, No. 289) lack the concluding formulae. The date of the verdict, however, is given by other sources – see Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 178-179.

15 Lucas David, Preussische Chronik, vol. VIII, p. 189; Tabulae, No. 289; for a detailed discussion on the contents of the verdict see Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 179-180.

16 Posilge, p. 313.

17 Długosz X/XI, pp. 51–52. On the one hand, the story of the language in which the verdict of Wenceslaus IV was said fits into the anecdotal nature of the relation of Długosz. On the other hand, it also matches the realities of the epoch, where the language of documents and diplomatic negotiations could have a political significance, cf. A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, pp. 168-176.

18 Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 184-185.

19 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, magni ducis Lithuaniae, ed. by A. Prochaska, Kraków 1882, App. VI, p. 1037; Jahrbücher Johannes Lindenblatts, ed. by J. Voigt, F. W. Schubert, Königsberg 1823, p. 209 (text in the footnote). 

20 Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum, 2nd ed., ed. by I Zakrzewski, vol. II, Poznań 1892, App. Nos. 57–59, pp. 447–449; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 185-186.

21 Franciscani Thorunensis Annales, p. 313.

22 Lites ac res gestae, 2nd ed., vol. II, App. No. 49; this letter was in extenso quoted in the Annals of Długosz, cf. A. Nalewajek, Dokument w „Rocznikach” Jana Długosza (Charters in the Annals of Jan Długosz), Lublin 2006, p. 221.

23 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, No. 426; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 68-69.

24 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, No. 427; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 65-66.

25 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, XX. HA, Ordensbriefarchiv, Nos. 1223, 1229; Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, App. IV, pp. 976–986; Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen, ed. by E. Weise, vol. I, Marburg 1970, No. 76. It must be underlined that contemporary correspondence and account sources confirm the Teutonic version of the affair of the ships with grain – see Wojna 1409-1411, s. 62-64 for details.

26 Długosz X/XI, p. 85.

27 Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski (Collection of Greater Poland’s Charters), vol. VIII, ed. by A. Gąsiorowski, T. Jasiński, Warszawa 1989, No. 647.

28 Geschichte des Geschlechts von Zitzewitz, ed. by M. Stojentin, vol. I (Urkundenbuch), Stettin 1900, No. 13; for doubts concerning the year date of this letter see Wojna 1409-1411, p. 192, footnote 73.

29 A. Reitemeier, Diplomatischer Alltag im Spätmittelalter. Gesandte in den englischen Beziehungen zu Frankreich und zur Hanse, [in:] Gesandtschafts- und Botenwesen im spätmittelalterlichen Europa, ed. by R. C. Schwinges, K. Wriedt, Ostfildern 2003, pp. 142–143; A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 179.

30 Hanserecesse, ed. by Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Section I, vol. V, Leipzig 1880, No. 639.

31 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 640; H. Świderska, Kilka epizodów ze stosunków polsko-angielskich za panowania Władysława Jagiełły (Some episodes from the Polish-English relations during the reign of Władysław Jagiełło), Teki Historyczne 8, 1956–1957, pp. 78–79 (not quite precise); A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach Europy Zachodniej XIV–XV w. (Poland in the opinions of Western Europe in the 14th-15th c.), Warszawa 1968, pp. 231–232; S. K. Kuczyński, Heroldowie króla polskiego (Heralds of the king of Poland), [in:] Venerabiles, nobiles et honesti. Studia z dziejów społeczeństwa Polski średniowiecznej (Venerabiles, nobiles et honesti. Studies on the history of the society of medieval Poland), ed. by A. Radzimiński, A. Supruniuk, J. Wroniszewski, Toruń 1997, p. 335; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 193.

32 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 639.

33 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 639.

34 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 639. It has been hitherto assumed in scholarship that Dietrich von Legendorf described the arrival of Jarosław of Iwno in the English court; on the other hand, the quoted letter only mentions the envoy being expected. If Iwieński and his companion actually had four stallions with them, it should be supposed that they actually set out on a longer journey and they eventually arrived in England; for these issues see Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 193-194.

35 O. Israel, Das Verhältnis des Hochmeisters des Deutschen Ordens zum Reich im 15. Jahrhundert, Marburg/Lahn 1952, Appendix 2, p. 83; cf. also ibid., p. 5; E. Potkowski, Pismo i polityka. Początki publicystyki politycznej w Polsce XV w. (Writing and politics. Beginnings of political publicism in Poland in the 15th c.), [in:] Kultura – polityka – dyplomacja. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Jaremie Maciszewskiemu w sześćdziesiątą rocznicę Jego urodzin (Culture – politics – diplomacy. Studies offered to Professor Jarema Maciszewski on His 60th birthday), ed. by A. Bartnicki et al., Warszawa 1990, p. 323, footnote 13.

36 Lites ac res gestae, 2nd ed, vol. II, App. No. 50, pp. 439–440.

37 Posilge, p. 323; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 195.

38 On the trade aspect of the Teutonic mission cf. S. Jenks, England, die Hanse und Preussen. Handel und Diplomatie 1377–1474, Part II, Köln–Wien 1992, pp. 539–549, especially pp. 542–543 and footnote 83.

39 Henry of Lancaster, then Count of Derby, was twice in Prussia, in 1390–1391 and in 1392, cf. W. Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen des europäischen Adels, Part I, Sigmaringen 1989, p. 134; see also A. Reitemeier, England, Preussen und Polen nach der Schlacht von Tannenberg. Anteilnahme, Kritik, Vermittlungstätigkeit, Zapiski Historyczne 63, 1998, fasc. 1, p. 20.

40 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 639; on erroneous interpretations in scholarship with regard to the text which is mentioned here see Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 195-196, footnote 85.

41 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 639; A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach, pp. 232–233.

42 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 639.

43 S. Jenks, England, die Hanse und Preussen, p. 543, footnote 85.

44 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 641; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 196.

45 Hanserecesse, vol. V, No. 655.

46 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, No. 429; Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego do roku 1411 (Northern policy of Sigismund of Luxembourg to 1411), Toruń 1964, p. 96.

47 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, No. 429; for interpretation doubts see Wojna 1409-1411, p. 202, footnote 112.

48 Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, p. 97.

49 Lites ac res gestae, 2nd ed., vol. 2, App. No. 53, s. 443–444; J. Garbacik, Zygmunt Luksemburczyk wobec wielkiej wojny polsko-krzyżackiej (1409-1411) (Sigismund of Luxembourg and the great Polish-Teutonic war (1409-1411), Małopolskie Studia Historyczne 3, 1960, fasc. 1/2, p. 18.

50 Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, p. 97; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 203.

51 J. K. Hoensch, König/Kaiser Sigismund, der Deutsche Orden und Polen-Litauen, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 46, 1997, p. 11.

52 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. II, No. 30; cf. Die Staatsverträge, vol. I, No. 78.

53 J. Garbacik, Zygmunt Luksemburczyk wobec wielkiej wojny, pp. 18–21; idem, Stanowisko cesarstwa i papiestwa wobec Wielkiej Wojny 1409–1411 (Position of the Empire and the Papacy towards the Great War of 1409-1411), Zeszyty Naukowe UJ, Prace historyczne, fasc. 8, 1961, pp. 14–15; Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, pp. 98–99; J. K. Hoensch, König/Kaiser Sigismund, pp. 11–12.

54 J. Garbacik, Zygmunt Luksemburczyk wobec wielkiej wojny, pp. 22–24; idem, Stanowisko cesarstwa i papiestwa wobec Wielkiej Wojny, pp. 14–15; Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, pp. 98–99.

55 Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, pp. 101–103; K. Dürschner, Der wacklige Thron, pp. 225–239.

56 This issue is described by Długosz X/XI, p. 169; cf. Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, p. 106–107.

57 S. Sroka, Ścibor ze Ściborzyc. Rys biograficzny (Ścibor of Ściborzyce. A biographic outline), [in]: Polska i jej sąsiedzi w późnym średniowieczu (Poland and its neighbours in the late Middle Ages), ed. by K. Ożog, S. Szczur, Kraków 2000, pp. 139–158; D. Dvořáková, Rytier a jeho král. Stibor zo Stiboríc a Žigmond Luxemburský. Sonda do života stredovekého uhorského šlachtica s osobitným zretel`om na územie Slovenska (The knight and his king. Stibor of Stiboríce and Sigismund of Luxembourg. Research on the life of a medieval Hungarian nobleman with special reference to the territory of Slovakia), Budmerice 2003; K. Jasiński, Rodowód Piastów mazowieckich (Genealogy of the Masovian Piasts), ed. by M. Górny, Poznań–Wrocław 1998 (recte 2008), pp. 111–114.

58 J. Garbacik, Zygmunt Luksemburczyk wobec wielkiej wojny, p. 18.

59 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. II, ed. by A. Lewicki, Kraków 1891, No. 29; I. Czamańska, Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna wobec Polski, Węgier i Turcji w XIV i XV wieku (Moldavia’s and Wallachia’s relations with Poland, Hungary and Turkey in the 14th and the 15th c.), Poznań 1996, p. 217.

60 I. Czamańska, Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna, pp. 217–219.

61 Wojna 1409-1411, p. 208.

62 M. Żdan, Stosunki litewsko-tatarskie za czasów Witolda, w. ks. Litwy (Lithuanian-Tartar relations in the times of Vytautas, Grand Duke of Lithuania), Ateneum Wileńskie 7, 1930, pp. 559-561; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 43.

63 S. Ekdahl, Ein Brief des Ritters Luppold von Köckritz an Hochmeister Ulrich von Jungingen vom April 1410, [in:] Prusy – Polska – Europa. Studia z dziejów średniowiecza i czasów wczesnonowożytnych (Prussia – Poland – Europe. Studies on the history of the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period), ed. by A. Radzimiński, J. Tandecki, Toruń 1999, pp. 240–243; Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, pp. 82–84, 86–88.

64 Długosz X/XI, pp. 23–26; Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, p. 93; J. Drabina, Kontakty papiestwa z Polską 1378-1417 w latach wielkiej schizmy zachodniej (Contacts of the Papacy with Poland 1378-1417 in the time of the Great Western Schism), Kraków 1993, pp. 39–43.

65 For sources and literature see J.-E. Beuttel, Der Generalprokurator des Deutschen Ordens an der römischen Kurie: Amt, Funktionen, personelles Umfeld und Finanzierung, Marburg 1999, pp. 44–47.

66 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. I, No. 39; J. Drabina, Kontakty papiestwa z Polską, p. 45; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 197.

67 Długosz X/XI, pp. 43, 174; J. Drabina, Kontakty papiestwa z Polską, p. 48.

68 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. I, ed. by A. Sokołowski, J. Szujski, Kraków 1876, Nos. 39, 41; K. Ożóg, Uczeni w monarchii Jadwigi Andegaweńskiej i Władysława Jagiełły (1384-1434) (Scholars in the monarchy of Hedwig of Angevin  and Władysław Jagiełło (1384-1434), Kraków 2004, p. 184.

69 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. I, No. 40; A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach Europy Zachodniej, p. 233.

70 J. Drabina, Kontakty papiestwa z Polską, pp. 48–49.

71 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. I, No. 39.

72 S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409-1411 (Great war with the Teutonic Order in 1409-1411) (5th ed.), Warszawa 1987, pp. 177–178; M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z zakonem krzyżackim 1308-1521 (Wars of Poland with the Teutonic Order 1308-1521), Gdańsk 1993, p. 50.

73 J. Mezník, Lucemburská Morava 1310-1423 (Moravia of the Luxembourg rulers 1310-1423), Praha 1999, pp. 234–236, 252, 256, 267–270, 283, 300.

74 S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna, pp. 180–181; J. Kostrzak, Stanowisko inflanckich władz zakonnych wobec wojen polsko-krzyżackich w latach 1409-1422 (Attitude of the Livonian authorities of the Teutonic Order towards the Polish-Teutonic wars in 1409-1422), Part I, Zapiski Historyczne 39, 1974, fasc. 4, pp. 13–14. The Livonian branch declared war on Lithuania on 28 May 1410, but it did not undertake any military activity against the Grand Duchy.

75 A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach Europy Zachodniej, p. 245; S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen, vol. I, Berlin 1982, pp. 127-130; E. Potkowski, Pismo i polityka, pp. 323-325; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 564.

76 S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, pp. 132-133, 160-161; K. Ożóg, Uczeni w monarchii, pp. 183-184; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 565-566.

77 S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, pp. 134-136; E. Potkowski, Pismo i polityka, pp. 325-326; A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, pp. 214-215.

78 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. III, ed. by A. Lewicki, Kraków 1894, Appendix 2, pp. 498-500; S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, pp. 136, 161-164; Wojna 1409-1411, p. 566.

79 Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, vol. III, Appendix 3, pp. 500-501; A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach, pp. 250-251.

80 A. Werminghoff, Ein Brief an Dietrich von Nieheim über die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, Altpreussische Monatsschrift 48, 1911, pp. 340-342; S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, pp. 133-134; K. Ożóg, Uczeni w monarchii, pp. 184-185; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 566-567.

81 M. Biskup, Das Echo der Tannenbergschlacht und der Belagerung Marienburgs im deutschen Zweig des Deutschen Ordens im Sommer 1410, in: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, vol. 2, ed. by U. Arnold, Marburg 1993, pp. 116-123.

82 Z. H. Nowak, Polityka północna, p. 104 and Appendix 2, pp. 131-132; A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach, p. 238; S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, pp. 181-182.

83 SRP, vol. III, pp. 453-456; K. Pieradzka, Bitwa grunwaldzka w obcych relacjach kronikarskich (pruskich, śląskich i zachodnioeuropejskich) (Battle of Grunwald in relations of foreign chronicles (Prussian, Silesian and Western Pomeranian ones), Małopolskie Studia Historyczne 3, 1960, fasc. 1/2, pp. 61-62; A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach, pp. 276-280; E. Potkowski, Pismo i polityka, pp. 327-328.

84 G. Sommerfeldt, Die Lage des Deutschen Ordens nach der Schlacht bei Tannenberg und die Anfänge der „Verschwörung” des Georg von Wirsberg, Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins 51, 1909, pp. 66-71; A. F. Grabski, Pogrunwaldzkie polemiki (Post-Grunwald polemics), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne, series I, fasc. 45, 1966, p. 47; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 569-570.

85 Jahrbücher Johannes Lindenblatts, Appendix III, pp. 395-399; A. F. Grabski, Polska w opiniach, p. 239; S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg, pp. 196-199.

86 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, XX. HA, Ordensbriefarchiv, Nos. 1481, 1482; A. F. Grabski, Pogrunwaldzkie polemiki, p. 49; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 570-571.

87 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 378; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 712-713.

88 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, pp. 378-379; Wojna 1409-1411, pp. 742-743.

89 K. Ożóg, Udział Andrzeja Łaskarzyca w sprawach i sporach polsko – krzyżackich do soboru w Konstancji (Participation of Andrzej Łaskarzyc in the Polish-Teutonic affairs and controversies until the Council of Constance), in: Polska i jej sąsiedzi w późnym średniowieczu (Poland and its neighbours in the late Middle Ages), ed. by K. Ożóg, S. Szczur, Kraków 2000, pp. 159-186.

90 Recently on this subject see W. Sieradzan, Misja Benedykta Makraia w latach 1412-1413. Z dziejów pokojowego rozwiązywania konfliktów w średniowieczu (Mission of Benedict Makrai in 1412-1413. On the history of peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Middle Ages), Malbork 2009.