Marek Sioma (Lublin)

The dispute around national consolidation during the war menace period (1938–1939)

The late 1930s was a peculiar period for the Second Republic of Poland. The beginning of 1938 was marked with a normalisation of the relations within the Piłsudski followers’ camp, which was expressed by the replacement – not merely a symbolical one – in the office of head of the National Unification Camp [Polish, Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego – OZN]: on his ‘voluntary’ resignation, Adam Koc was succeeded by General Statnisław Skwarczyński. The new OZN leader was tasked with alleviating the internal tensions and completing (in fact, building from the scratch, in a number of cases) the organisation’s central (the Supreme Council) and local structures. Coming to the post of leader of Poland’s largest political party, Gen. Skwarczyński could not foresee the highly dynamic developments that made it necessary to incessantly respond to the changes taking place. Enough to say that OZN uncritically supported the Government’s policies, constantly and consistently engaging itself in propagating its ‘successful achievements’ – be it the normalisation of the relations with Lithuania in March 1938 or the annexation of Zaolzie area (part of the Cieszyn Silesia west of the Olza river)¹ in October. Both occurrences were moreover seen as related to the triumphant idea of national unification within the society², and even compared to the call for defence of Poland in 1920³.

It should be emphasised that the slogan of national consolidation⁴ (unification), presented – not without a reason – to the former Legionnaires⁵ on 24th May 1936 by General Edward Śmigły-Rydz, Inspector General of the Armed Forces⁶, became an element in the campaign advocating a reintegration of the society, found fragmented and decomposed at the time.⁷ The idea, as grasped by its creator and executors⁸, was to effectively provide a platform for a nationwide as well as in-camp collaboration⁹, meant to bring about a unification of a possibly largest share of the society unified through a common effort to defend the country¹⁰. The latter was to be achieved through the country’s development, which path was seen as a “driver of Poland’s military and economic strength” and the only road to get the nation fully mobilised in the time of a war peril.¹¹ Thus, it came out as the major premise upon which the nation was to be ‘unified’, ‘consolidated’; the ‘road-sign’ was to be the Political-ideological declaration.¹² These assumptions, far-fetched as they proved, were not shared by everyone, though. The political Opposition voiced their reservations and doubts, along with the OZN-affiliated Young Poland Association [Związek Młodej Polski] – the latter arguing that a consolidation would turn feasible, and successful when and if a possibly largest number of people formed an elitist group of national activists.¹³

The first realistic description of what a national consolidation was, as based upon an analysis of assumptions and achievements, was expressed in February 1939 by a certain ‘Kar.’, on the grounds of an extensive discussion concerning not only a unification¹⁴ but also the OZN as a political structure. In an opinion he proposed, this author named OZN the first ideological-political movement adapted to the political-system framework of Poland in its independence period, perceiving the organisation as a focus within which a new national ideology was getting formed (with regards to politics, society, culture and economy) for a new Poland. Such ideology was not subject to elaboration, whether theoretical or practical, as its emergence would depend upon an organised nation to which “unification is just the first necessary means ensuring the attainment of the goal of our contemporary Poland’s generation”.¹⁵ Let us add that this concept initially (May 1936 to September 1938) did not enjoy the expected support whether from the society¹⁶ or among some Piłsudski adherent camp’s activists, who, “with their eyes fixed on the existing organisational forms, missed the deep psychical process evolving inside the nation’s soul. They could not see the triumphant idea of national consolidation pave the way for itself”¹⁷. Still, the changing geopolitical situation made this idea definitely more significant, forging it into the main element of political addresses¹⁸ and press enunciations on international politics extending to the Polish raison d’état.

The journalism, which was the main space where the consolidation was disputed, was used by the political adversaries not as a means of mutual persuasion but rather, of winning over the public opinion. The point is that there was no politically uninvolved daily press in the two decades between the World Wars, while the society’s awareness and attitudes depended upon the choice of a concrete paper or magazine. Thus, OZN followers would mainly focus on Gazeta Polska; socialists read Robotnik; nationalists, apart from a whole array of local dailies, focused their attention on the Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy [‘The Warsaw National Daily’]. The whole thing formed, in an approximation, a summarised picture of the perception, and reception, of the notion of national consolidation.

In the war peril time, whose beginning should be seen as related with the German proposals to normalise the relations with Poland (Gesamtlösung)¹⁹,the national consolidation slogan become subject to a broad discussion and polemics for, primarily (though not exclusively), press organs of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and OZN. The planes on which the consolidation dispute went on reflected the period’s polemics between the Opposition and the ruling camp. There were several elements to it of key importance – primarily, the dispute on the form and content of unification²⁰, the Commander-in-Chief²¹, the political-system dimension (a polemic related to the postulate to democratise the social life)²² and the social dimension²³, or, the role and importance of (the) opposition²⁴. Much less controversy was triggered by the postulate to get consolidated based upon the concept to defend the state in the face of external threat, albeit in this case OZN’s ‘rigid’ position again incited the adversaries to contest the proposed methods of consolidation.

The propaganda action for a national unity was rendered more dynamic as Czechoslovakia was forced to return the Zaolzie Silesia area, seized by the Czechs in 1919. OZN activists and columnists made use of this peculiar ‘turning point’ as evidence to a strength of the army and the state, that is, factors characterising a dynamic organism, full of vitality and ready to go on taking actions. The problematic issue which was nonetheless identified was an apparent internal unity of the society, demonstrated officially and expressed in a common uncritical optimism (which was a short-lived phenomenon, though) and a support for the ‘successful’ army and diplomatic service.²⁵ In an address to dwellers of Kielce of 2nd October 1938 at the unveiling of the Legions monument, Kazimierz Sosnkowski spoke of the need to spare no moral and physical efforts to the benefit of Poland’s strength, which was derived from the resolution of a series of political and economic issues – and of social wrongs. The cure he could propose was to attract “a possibly large number of Poles for collaboration and shared responsibility”, as he believed that the “desire for unity, which the Commander-in-Chief is so emphatically demanding”, was commonplace in Poland – and indeed inevitable in face of the need to ensure safety and a future to this country.²⁶ A dozen-or-so days later, Wacław Makowski presented this very issue expressly, asking, “whom are we supposed to stand by, en masse? By those who in their incessant effort, step by step, elevate Poland upwards, or by those who exclaim, ‘You’re not supposed!’?”²⁷. The Piłsudski followers were convinced that the reply was unambiguous – and it turned into a nationwide action of meetings promoting OZN as the only movement capable of rendering the nation unified²⁸. Followers were won over as a result²⁹, but the society, politically diversified, passed over this lightly rather soon, following the example of the Opposition press.

The political Opposition’s position did not, and indeed could not, have any significant influence on the change in the perception of the national consolidation slogan. The success of the Zaolzie action outright produced a conviction whereby OZN should have intensified its action toward a broader propagation of the consolidation concept and made use of the interest from the mass media in order to successfully persuade the irresolute within the society. The task was uneasy, especially with no formal structure in place that would pose as a goal for itself to disseminate the national unity watchword. Still, its popularisation was not spontaneous, as a matter of fact.

Responsibility for the action in question, in its entirety, was assumed by the Editorial Board of Gazeta Polska – OZN’s official press organ, which was as if ‘ex officio’ predestined to act as a populariser of the national consolidation. The newspaper also accepted the odium of criticism and polemics coming out from various milieus (including from the Piłsudski followers’ camp). Let it be emphasised that a body of publications dealing with this particular issue included texts signed with names (or, at times, initials) or recorded occasional addresses or speeches, or interviews offered by leading politicians to Gazeta columnists. It was a ‘break-over point’ for polemists who, when referring to those enunciations, did not limit themselves to confuting their adversaries’ arguments but added to the consolidation issue their own conclusions, reflections and judgements.

The first plane of combat whereon the national consolidation was made useful was the parliamentary election campaign of October/November 1938. Let us add that it was a wide-ranging action to which Government representatives contributed, including the Prime Minister himself who, as a Robotnik columnist put it, while damning the National Democracy, summoned “all to gather and consolidate”.³⁰ Felicjan Sławoj Składkowski’s words meant however that the Government and OZN intended to put a remarkable emphasis on the concept’s revitalisation in the society. A few days later, resumption of the dream concept of ‘harmony’ and ‘concord’ was subject to critical comments from the Opposition which blamed the OZN-affiliated newspapers for criticising those “willing to trigger confusion with a thought of class struggle”.³¹ The phrase depicted, to quite an extent, the essence of the ongoing dispute, as the left-wing political Opposition constantly reminded of the need to first democratise the political life by calling OZN to “cleanse the house of the garbage” in the first place and thereafter think of a consolidation, which was impossible to carry out anyway, given the prevalent state of affairs in autumn 1938.³² General Lucjan Żeligowski echoed these statements by accusing OZN, in the conservative daily Słowo, of erroneous politics practised in particular with respect to the masses, finding e.g. that “if willing to arouse enthusiasm and really unite the nation, one had better not approach it with impendence but rather, with a code of law held in the hand and with magnanimity at heart"³³. Kazimierz Czapiński’s persuasions were no less powerful: he travestied the call “All Join OZN!” by inciting whoever could not do so to “obediently follow OZN”.³⁴

These enunciations implied opinions uttered by exponents of the Piłsudski camp, including its nationalist members (Zdzisław Stahl coming to the fore), who argued that the Polish society had crossed out the anachronistic pre-war party-bound splits, accepting now the new programme framework – including the society’s national unity, not quite acceptable an approach to all political opponents.³⁵ One of the most ‘stubborn’ and ‘jammed’ among them was Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, editor-in-chief of Robotnik, the leading antagonist and critic of OZN’s actions, adherer of democratisation of the social-political life, a leading activist with PPS – the party that was meant to be eliminated from the political life of Poland, following the 1938 election. ³⁶ Quite significantly, ever since OZN was formed, the Opposition was gaining in importance – not merely owing to its imminent strength: a ‘spotlight’ was lit on it, and on the society, as an appeal was made “to unify and to quit any unimportant disputes”³⁷. OZN realised moreover that the impact of the consolidation pace depended upon the attitude of the Opposition which has ignored “the hand extended in reconciliation”, to which the society responded pejoratively by voting OZN in the parliamentary election of 1938. Thus, the national consolidation slogan appeared to be a strength, rather than a weakness, as the Opposition believed it to be.³⁸ Taken into account were also the outcomes of local-government elections, won by the Opposition, which only yielded to its opponents in some cities. OZN columnists and politicians found it satisfactory, though, for arguing that OZN had proved successful in this area as well, as what the society apparently preferred was “the idea of concord, the idea to come to a conciliation, to determine a single shared [candidate] list”, rather than a breakup and party-based splits.³⁹ In their appraisal, the breakup of vote ⁴⁰ was an argument speaking for, rather than against, the idea to unite – contrary to what the Opposition claimed – as the victories of PPS or of the National Party [Stronnictwo Narodowe; SN] had to provide a substratum for multiply intensified effort toward preventing “disastrous effects of the breakup of the Nation”.⁴¹ A selection was announced on this occasion into those “who contribute to the erection of an edifice of unity and power – and those who constitute an active or passive obstacle to this labour”⁴², thus clearly suggesting that national unification and consolidation remained the major purpose and strife for OZN, now using different methods than those resorted to before the election.

The thus heralded alteration in the methods was articulated by Wacław Makowski, Speaker of the Sejm [Lower House of the Parliament] of 5th Term-of-Office, who sought internal consolidation through concordant cooperation of state institutions (parliamentary members and ministers), emphasising that the goal had been set by Józef Piłsudski as he postulated a “Poland unified”; this “essential unification”, as Makowski phrased it, referred not only to a reunification of the lands formerly seized by the partitioning powers, with a uniformity of the legal framework, but, in the first place, to brining about “an active integration of the Nation”⁴³. This parliamentary speaker saw this postulate as “deliverable”; the head of OZN declared from the Sejm rostrum that “in the ideological area, we already have completed a national consolidation work”, against which no political force had been able to juxtapose anything of essence”.⁴⁴ He interpreted the unification concept as a “great fresh current” that was ravishing for the society.⁴⁵ Let us add that the Sejm was to join the action propagating the national consolidation, as opposed to what this body did during its preceding, fourth, term-of-office (1935–8). Yet, the optimistic attitude of the OZN leader was shared neither by the socialist Robotnik nor by the Christian-Democratic Polonia – the latter calling for accelerated delivery of the national consolidation slogan, taking into account a broad social spectrum (inclusive of the peasantry) and claiming that “nothing can possibly be smuggled here, nobody cheated, and no-one can get off lightly”.⁴⁶

The problem was that each of the parties to the effort followed its own concept of consolidation. The Piłsudski adherents’ group would not admit a compromise as far as the idea of ‘national unity’ was concerned, and scuttled any attempt at disavowing the concept they had outlined.⁴⁷ By using the epithet ‘maniacs’, they denied their political adversaries the right to understand the notion in question as compromising between the agreeing (unification-oriented) parties, particularly as the trade-off was not to be based on similar slogans but on the real political strivings appearing contradictory.⁴⁸ Neither party was willing to accept the reasons of the other, which generated new planes of conflict. The debate went not as much about the principles (the need to consolidate⁴⁹) or methods as about the concept and its delivery.⁵⁰ OZN definitely rejected a coalition of parties as an initial stage and possible prerequisite for the nation’s unity, arguing that it would be “a grist to the mill of breakup, rather than a national unity".⁵¹ Along with it, he protested against reducing the OZN’s rank to just one among the political parties, arguing that this organisation was “genetically” rooted “in the guidelines of the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for preparing the Nation in a versatile manner for the ordeals and experiences it may be facing”.⁵² He only admitted a “unification of good-willed people” – which meant those who had rejected the past and former organisational structures (bonds!), and those who should like, “equal among the equal, share the responsibility for the State with their yesterday’s opponents”.⁵³ Any other consolidation would be considered undeliverable by them.⁵⁴ By launching and propagating the belief that a national unification was a must, the Commander-in-Chief (the originator) and OZN (the deliverer) monopolised the idea’s execution.

An option to join the execution was merely proposed to the political adversaries, without a realistic influence on the shape and the methods, under the rules differing from expected.⁵⁵ The Piłsudski followers’ camp argued that E. Śmigły-Rydz’s indications, including a consolidation, were not deliverable through a resumption of old political forms.⁵⁶ The offer was eventually rejected; the dispute was getting intensified, alongside the increasingly realistic threat of armed conflict. Both parties endeavoured to take advantage of the consolidation watchword (Piłsudski camp sought a national consolidation, whilst the socialists placed a bet on the Nation’s genuine unification) as a carrier of their own views and ideas. The press organs of both parties to the dispute tried to outdo each other in creating a picture of success (Piłsudski camp) or failures (the socialists) of consolidation⁵⁷, without caring much for reflecting the situation in its reality. Gazeta Polska no doubt shone among them; its columnists made early 1939 the moment for analyses and summaries. Among those, one finding deserves special attention: “the Polish nation, in its tremendous majority, is already marching obediently along the road indicated by the Commander-in-Chief. And it shall go on marching so in the year 1939.”⁵⁸

It is clearly apparent that the governmental press organ made attempts in early 1939 to persuade its readers, as well as political adversaries (using polemics as a means of dispute), that the national unity/consolidation as advocated by OZN did not lead to the society’s division into two hostile camps (Hispanisation), and that the final delivery of the idea of national consolidation could be contributed to by anyone willing to do so.⁵⁹ For the Piłsudski camp, it was beyond any doubt (or rather, they were not willing to accept any option to the contrary) that their own concept of national unification was the only potentially successful one, with efforts contributed by those who were ready to drag the ‘chain’ lifting Poland upwards.⁶⁰ As evidence of proper implementation, activities were highlighted of people stemming from another ideological trunk, who, “propitiated for the idea of national unification”, not only joined OZN but quite often played a key part therein”.⁶¹ The decisive factor was their qualifications, as a matter of fact. It is irresistible to conclude that preventing the allegations from the Opposition eventually made Witold Ipohorski-Lenkiewicz reflectionless, for the statement claiming that ‘newcomers’ were coming to key positions is also perceivable in terms of the centre-of-gravity being moved rightwards (yes; e.g. Z. Stahl), if not in terms of a decreased importance of the ‘Legions trunk’ activists. In spite of this conviction, or perhaps in contrast to it, a Gazeta Polska columnist persuaded: “Could there possibly be any better proof that a national unification is being delivered indeed, and that the elected road – is the right one?"⁶² Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, in his address to members of the Reserve Officers’ Association, stated, in turn, on their behalf, that the Association not only believed in the possibility of a broad national consolidation under the auspices of OZN but outright deemed it to be a historical necessity.⁶³

Not everyone shared this conviction, adding that consolidation was one of the hindrances (apart from the new parliamentary and local-government regulations) OZN has ‘contracted’ in attempted defence of its privileged position⁶⁴; the way to unification was to be set through OZN alone⁶⁵, and was to be made by “OZN Legionnaires” backed by “mannerly” people.⁶⁶ This conviction has been pictured, for instance, by means of a satirical commentary (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1: “National consolidation, according to OZN activists”

(caption reads: “We’ve got no room for you in here!”)

Source: Zwrot, Katowice, 29.01.1939, No. 4, p. 10

The Opposition has many a time stressed that OZN was turning totalitarian. Yet, the Rev. Ferdynand Machay argued that totalitarianism, following the Italian and German patterns, must have been rooted in a psychological substrate, which he could not identify with the “present national unification slogan”⁶⁷; yet, this Senator by the will of the President of the Republic also made an appeal to Premier Składkowski for a freedom for “political parties of Poland” to express themselves, which would allow for development of a motto all the citizens would follow.⁶⁸ This come out as a confirmation that the national consolidation slogan did not enjoy full support from a broad spectrum of the society.

The problem at stake would assume a different shape if we take into account the society’s support for the issues of the country’s defence. Niedziałkowski noticed that this attitude characterised a “genuine consolidation”, doing credit to the generation in its entirety.⁶⁹ On this basis, not identifying the plane on which the dispute was developing, he postulated that the authority vs. the society relation be modified – which ought to be expressed through altered election regulations, rejection of totalitarian ideas, and free election.⁷⁰ This opinion was, in a sense, maintained by the official propaganda, drawing the attention, however, on the necessity to follow the order to build an organisation and to mobilise internal powers, so that, in case of external threat, there be an unrestrained certainty of victory. It was postulated that the assumptions be put into effect through “extracting from the man and the earth, from the will and Polish nature, a maximum of organised and disciplined force, of the utmost civic and military virtues, of the most efficient skills of flexibility”.⁷¹ Anyone who would oppose the delivery of the plan proposed by E. Śmigły-Rydz was accused of jobbery, anarchistic attitude, irresponsibility, if not meanness. The reason was a belief whereby the nation should struggle with theoreticians and propagators of breakup or fragmentation, opposing any doctrine that would disseminate among the masses the conviction that “it is by decomposition that Poland stands”.⁷² In February 1939, an OZN analyst believed that the political opposition’s views on consolidation and related methods made it legitimate to state that a “victory of the increasingly ponderous and conquering idea of National Unity”⁷³ had already been the case. A similar voice was expressed by the OZN Head of Staff, as he communicated, in a radio speech on the second anniversary of the Ideological-political declaration, that the unification idea OZN had been serving has extended to, and overwhelmed, wide circles of the society, already having celebrated “the days of its grand triumph, several times”, given the short period in which it was delivered.⁷⁴ Yet, the Head Commander of the Polish Legionnaires’ Association [ZLP] called his subordinates to intensify their efforts to develop defensive capability and consolidation, stressing that a “Legionnisation of the national life” has only occurred in Poland (sic!).⁷⁵ In late March 1939, the Head of OZN, on instructing the heads of districts, postulated, among other things, that consolidation be carried on, the terrain infested, sentiments mobilised and military readiness reinforced.⁷⁶

Let us note that the notion of national consolidation aroused discussions and polemics still in the first quarter of 1939. OZN’s intensified action for the sake of unification, taken and built upon the conviction that it was necessary to get prepared (integrated) in face of a possible armed conflict, doubtlessly informed this juncture. This aspect was powerfully articulated, at an OZN Supreme Council meeting in February 1939, by Gen. S. Skwarczyński: referring to the international situation, he highlighted that “the only warranty of any nation and any state is its own force, its own moral power, based upon the moral power of the entire nation”.⁷⁷ The round anniversary of the Ideological-political declaration had its say too. The dispute went on about the form and scope of consolidation, in the first place.⁷⁸ OZN-affiliated politicians and commentators argued that “the consolidation the Camp is to carry out today is not blind or ‘taken on trust’ – conversely, it is being delivered upon the level of strictly defined guidelines, accepted as obligatory”⁷⁹. Those guidelines were grounded, it was said, in the nation’s psychical and moral values, on the ‘imponderables’, to use Józef Piłsudski’s term.⁸⁰

This ascertainment came across retorts from adversaries. The National Democrats offered their own vision of consolidation, postulating to reject a unification based on the past, deeming it unfeasible and nonsensical; instead, unification was to be delivered in view of a common future and purpose. They requested that this be done “in the name of contradicting any sense to politics in general”.⁸¹ On 18th March 1939, Lucjan Żeligowski addressed the MPs to discontinue the parliamentary deliberations, appealing to the Prime Minister to declare “what is he intending to undertake to heighten the moral and material powers of the Homeland immediately?”⁸² On the following day, the OZN daily, in its polemics column Niedyskrecje [‘Indiscretions’], informed its readers that the program in question had been delivered for three years by then, the authority implementing the slogans of E. Śmigły-Rydz (that is, the National Unification Camp) of internal unity (consolidation) and outward defensive capability having been doing so for two years.⁸³ The accompanying finding was that the society awaited a conclusion to the dispute around consolidation.⁸⁴ April 1939 saw Jędrzej Moraczewski persuade that the strife for a nationwide unity was common⁸⁵, and yet it was blocked by OZN which could not understand that an ‘armistice’ could be the only way to accomplish it ⁸⁶ – something the Camp did not strive for. Again, in a letter of 24th May 1939 to President Ignacy Mościcki, Mr. Moraczewski expressed his belief that the elite governing Poland – OZN activists, primarily – were not prepared for the great effort of defence against the Germans.⁸⁷ His judgement was that an obstacle to the nation’s consolidation was not so much a method, which could be redeveloped into a system combining obedience and imponderables creating a power⁸⁸, but rather, the activists who proved incapable of delivering the task the politics had posed before them. He postulated that the process of change be started with a reconstructed Government⁸⁹, finding the rescue in the Commander-in-Chief.⁹⁰ It was not only Moraczewski, then leader of the Association of Trade Unions [Związek Związków Zawodowych; hereinafter, ‘ZZZ’], who realised what the outcome of the possible confrontation with the invader may be; similarly to Stanisław Mackiewicz, he called for real action, whereas OZN activists postulated an in-depth consolidation, so that the potential aggressor could be persuaded (sic!) that “Poland is a camp of united Polish people, males and females alike, ready to fight to the bitter end!”⁹¹

Significantly, the ‘belief’ shared by some Piłsudski camp members⁹² in the accomplishment of a national unification/consolidation was identical with the conviction prevalent among the socialist Opposition, not calling this fact into question⁹³, and among certain foreign observers.⁹⁴ Those who challenged it, in turn, was the right-wing Opposition, focusing on the circumstance that in order for the nation to get united, it should have to be aware in the name of what, and by what ways, such consolidation would go.⁹⁵ The parties to the dispute, the OZN and the socialists, differed however in their belief as to who, and in what a way, has accomplished this. OZN politicians and commentators ascribed the goal’s achievement to their own actions and policy-making; their adversaries, not sharing this view, noticed that the credit went, well, to Adolf Hitler, as the one who had united the Polish nation as he seized Bohemia and Moravia, in spite of Poland’s position.⁹⁶ Hence, the consolidation came out as a consequence of the international occurrences, rather than OZN’s activity; on the domestic soil, the aftermath was a common front, within the notion of ‘unification’ (extending to ‘surviving’ communists, PPS, through to the extreme right-wing). A challenging question was formulated on this occasion about the sense of the Camp’s existence – once the national unity has become a fact.⁹⁷ But no reply was awaited! In a sense, one was given by Gen. S. Skwarczyński who said that no change had been needed whilst OZN fully trusted the actions taken by the President of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief. The discussion was not completely concluded at that point, all the more that it was being heated up by the events taking place in the international politics forum, unambiguously indicating that that the German-Polish conflict turned, from its incubation phase (24th October 1938–15th March 1939) into a real menace. This state was extremely dangerous – to Poland in general and to OZN in particular: with its monopolistic political concepts, it got exposed to an even more severe criticism from the Opposition Adam Próchnik stated outright that the conviction whereby a “monoparty was tantamount to a unity of the nation” was but a legend: for a unification to be of an appropriate nature, it was necessary that it be an “act of conscious will"⁹⁸; thus, the consolidation action carried out by OZN was disavowed, on the whole. The reply came immediately, expressed through the conviction that the national consolidation concept was an imperative of the Polish internal politics, grounded in “the premises unchangeable to the extent that the geographical elements of the Polish reality prove unalterable”, with OZN being supposed for struggle for them up to the moment they became an integral part of “the blood and brains of the whole Nation”.⁹⁹ An exemplary action of this sort was e.g. the billing by the Metalworkers’ Union (part of the ZZZ), in Warsaw and some other towns, of a manifesto calling for abandonment of internal struggle and integration of “all the good will” under the aegis of OZN. Such common accession would moreover put an end to a party- and job-related decomposition. Robotnik came with an immediate response, focusing in conclusion on the unification methods (common enrolment with OZN) it found typical to OZN-ers’ mentality and psychology – typical to those who would not ever intend to quit their privileged position.¹⁰⁰ Such words could only trigger a polemic.

The one to respond was the leading OZN/nationalist commentator who, using the example of the Metalworkers’ Union on an auxiliary basis, argued that the unification idea was winning increasing understanding and acceptance among the workers, for the unity programme was a “viable and zestful striving of all the Polish strata toward a unity and power”.¹⁰¹ These assertions should be regarded as a peculiar breakage of the taboo with respect to OZN members’ having recourse to, or seeking support from, the society’s lower layers (workers and peasants). As it is clear, as the war was becoming increasingly real, or even certain (just to refer to the Sejm speech of Foreign Minister Józef Beck of 5th May 1939), OZN politicians endeavoured to mobilise those environments even more strongly.¹⁰² Two days after Mr. Beck’s address, the OZN Head of Staff found that a complete unity of the nation and implementation of the social justice rules had been the only ways to mobilise all the nation’s powers. In this labour, workers and peasants should have regarded the “order of national solidarity, and that is, unity” as binding¹⁰³, from which a possibility to attain a social justice stemmed. The way to do it was merely to quit party or class struggling, to the benefit of compliance with the Commander-in-Chief’s directives “within a single mass-scale patriotic labour union", as he perceived the Association of Polish Trade Unions.¹⁰⁴

There is no doubt that the permanent external threat implied an increasing national consolidation. The term was understood in different ways by various milieus, but it is doubtless that the nation’s majority definitely stood for implementation of the Government’s policy opposing Germany’s demands. The success of the National Defence Fund and the Air Defence Loan was evidence that the programme to reinforce of the state’s defensive power enjoyed common support but did not ultimately prove that a national consolidation has been completed. This is how these issues were seen by Opposition representatives; in Zdzisław Stahl’s opinion, however, a programme for the future needed being formulated – one of “a still further fetched, deeper, more solid and thorough internal unity”.¹⁰⁵ This analysis was rooted in the assumption that unity and unanimity of spirits in the face of a menace could not constitute a foundation or a factor decisive for a strength of the state, being but a succor of the existing force and a ‘raw material’ transformable into a durable value. These findings seem to be an intelligent and logical consequence of the striving for implementation of the idea of a single, great and common political camp, embracing all the areas of the Polish society’s life, including the society itself. Such conclusions were formulated as OZN regarded what was going on in the society to be a levy-en-masse whereupon the state’s (and the nation’s) tomorrow or strength could not possibly be founded. Disbelief in a transformation of the Opposition parties had a say there too. Therefore, the aim should be, it was claimed, to strive for extended and deepened unity of the society for a future, while denying the Opposition’s legitimacy to have a resolving voice.¹⁰⁶ These conclusions came across a definitely negative comment three days later from a Robotnik commentator, signed with an initial, who punch-lined it thus: “Privileges for OZN – greater than so far, perhaps? Add to it a monopoly in pursuance of politics in the State, how about that?”¹⁰⁷ This passage may serve as a model example for the level of conversation between columnists of both involved currents – a proof that national consolidation constantly formed an element of political journalism. And, it may make us aware of how fierce and hard-line the dispute was.

The last summer-holiday months of the last year of peace saw no modification in the rhetoric applied. Official enunciations, emphasising the nation’s warlike readiness for great deeds and no errors made by OZN in the preparations¹⁰⁸, along with a “truth of the society’s own force” penetrating deep down the consciousness of the society at large"¹⁰⁹, plus the application of a “standby culture” were instantly evaluated and commented¹¹⁰. The interlocutors stressed the anti-democratic quality of OZN’s policies and its contradictoriness to society’s strivings for unity, in defence of its vital interests.¹¹¹

Let it be added that this state of affairs lasted till the outbreak of the German-Polish war on 1st September 1939. The fact that both parties really wanted to have ‘the last say’ on it was not of the least importance.¹¹² Hence, what they endeavoured to do was to make use of any arising opportunity to inform the readers of the topical occurrences having to do with the progressing national consolidation. The polemic had, let us point out, the initiating party (OZN-affiliated Gazeta Polska) and the commenting party (Robotnik) to it. The whole possibly forms a (rather incomplete) picture of perception of, and course taken by, the national consolidation process; I believe, though, that it suffices for proposing a few key conclusions.

First, the concept of the national consolidation slogan has been delivered, since its initiation in 1936 by E. Śmigły-Rydz, by the National Unification Camp – from the moment the organisation was set up, until the outbreak of the war with Germany. Against the various phases of delivery, the idea maintained its constant and permanent goal – the care about “the future of the Nation that will have to face the impending tempests” one day¹¹³, its amplitude rising as the external threat was growing real. The underlying assumption was that the ideology which had given rise to the slogan and concept of national consolidation was based upon the instructions and recommendations given by Józef Piłsudski, who made the belief in the nation’s own powers the foundation of the nationality and nationhood.